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THE LEGITIMATION OF ELECTRONIC
EAVESDROPPING: THE POLITICS
OF "LAW AND ORDER"
Herman Schwartz*
I.

INTRODUCTION

recently, the eavesdropping impasse in Congress had continued for so long that it seemed to be a permanent fixture.
For over thirty years, bills to relax the total ban on wiretapping had
been unsuccessfully introduced in each session of Congress. 1 As
usual, signs of change came only from the Supreme Court, which in
1967 began to inch toward approval of limited eavesdropping under
strict controls.2 Then, quite swiftly, a mating of longstanding
Southern resentment toward the Court and the more recent popular
anxiety about lawlessness spawned the Omnibus Crime Control and
Safe Streets Act of 1968.3 Title I of this statute authorizes federal
assistance to state efforts to improve the quality of their law enforcement, substantially as recommended by the Johnson Administration.
Contrary to the Administration's wishes, however, the legislation
does not stop there. Congress, led by Senators John McClellan of
Arkansas and James 0. Eastland of Mississippi, added the probably
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I. The total ban on wiretapping appears in § 605 of the Communications Act, 47
U.S.C. § 605 (1958); the bills to revise § 605 introduced prior to 1959 are listed in
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 4, at 781-1031 (1959).
2. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347; Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41.
3. P.L. 90-351 Oune 19, 1968) (hereinafter Act]. This victory was the culmination
of a long campaign, which included the Valachi hearings before Senator McClellan's
committee [see Bell, The Myth of the Cosa Nostra, 46 NEW I.EADER Dec. 23, 1963, at
12, 14] and continuous pressure for legitimation after Senator Edward V. Long's Subcommittee on Administrative Practices and Procedure exposed the vast amount of illegal eavesdropping engaged in by governmental agencies. For examples of such
pressure, see Graham, Setback ls Noted in Fight on Crime, N.Y. Times, July 18, 1965,
§ 1, at I, col. 4; Landauer, Bugging Backlash, Wall St. J., March 6, 1967, p. I, col. 1.
The Long Subcommittee Hearings on Invasions of Privacy by Governmental Agencies
were held in 1965 and 1966. A detailed and depressing account of the political and
legislative history of the whole Omnibus Crime Control Act appears in Harris, Annals
of Legislation-The Turning Point, NEW YORKER, Dec. 14, 1968, at 68-179; for title
III in particular, see id. at 152-63. Harris sums up congressional views of the Act as
follows: "[A]ll those who voted against it, many of those who voted for it, and most
of those who didn't vote at all [believed] that the bill was a piece of demagoguery
devised out of malevolence and enacted in hysteria." Id. at 68.
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unconstitutional4 provisions of title II which seek to prevent application of Miranda v. Arizona5 and United States v. Wade 6 in
federal courts; a shamefully feeble gun control section-title IVwhich has since been superseded; 7 a retrogressive title V imposing a
five-year ban on government employment of anyone convicted of a
felony in connection with a riot or civil disorder; and of perhaps
greatest ultimate impact, title III, of dubious constitutionality, which
authorizes frequent and prolonged eavesdropping by federal and
state investigators under "controls" which range from the ineffective to the nonexistent. 8 Despite the questionable nature of these
measures, congressional reaction to public concern about crime drove
the entire bill through Congress by ovenvhelming margins.
Almost simultaneously with the passage of the Crime Control
Act, the Advisory Committee on the Police Function of the American Bar Association's Project on Minimum Standards for Criminal
Justice issued a tentative draft which also authorizes electronic eavesdropping by federal and state officials. The ABA draft, Standards
Relating to Electronic Surveillance, and its supporting commentaries are quite similar to title III and the Senate Judiciary Committee Report that accompanied it.9 The similarity is hardly surprising; both bills, as well as the ABA commentaries, were prepared
by Professor G. Robert Blakey of Notre Dame Law School, probably
the foremost academic spokesman for the legitimation of electronic
eavesdropping.10 The ABA tentative draft is thus a brief for elec4. See Wechsler, Letter to the N.Y. Times, June 16, 1968, § 4, at 17, col. 3.
5. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
6. 388 U.S. 218 (1967). The Act also struck at the Court's decision in Mallory v.
United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957), but this attack raised no constitutional issues.
7. P.L. 90-618 (1968).
8. Even President Richard M. Nixon has criticized title III because "in some
respects it failed to define clearly the acceptable limits of the practice." CIVIL LtnEllTIES,
Oct. 1968, at 10, col. 2.
Title III contains not only eavesdropping authority but also a little-noted immunity
provision applying to frtJery offense for which federal officers may use electronic surveillance. This encompasses far more than was contemplated under separate immunity legislation then pending. See S. 677, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967). The Act contains six
other substantive "anticrime" provisions in addition to those mentioned in the
text.
9. See S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968) [hereinafter S. REP. No. 1097].
One of the similarities can be seen in a revealing bit of Orwellian "newspeak": in
both the Senate and ABA reports, the dichotomy constantly referred to is one allegedly
between "privacy and justice," not between "privacy and law enforcement," as it is
usually put. Compare PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMIN•
ISTRATION OF JUsrICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 203 (1967), with,
e.g., AMERICAN BAR AssoCIATION PROJEcr ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: STANDARDS RELATING TO ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE 13, 21 (1968) [hereinafter ABA
STANDARDS].
10. Professor Blakey was described as "the principal draftsman" of title III [see
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tronic eavesdropping in general and for much of title III in particular, and it is useful to examine them together.11
This Article will examine some constitutional considerations
raised by wiretapping and eavesdropping in light of recent Supreme
Court decisions, the probable extent of such activity, the limitations
imposed upon it by title III and the ABA Standards, and the arguments for the "necessity" of electronic surveillance. Finally, a few
jaundiced comments will be offered about legislative and judicial
lawmaking in the field of criminal justice, particularly in a time of
crisis.
II. THE

NONPARTICULARIZED SEARCH

A. The Unconstitutional Indiscriminateness of the Intrusion
Authorized by Title III
The chief argument against the constitutionality of most kinds
of eavesdropping12 is that the resulting search and seizure is unavoidably too sweeping to comply with the particularity requirements of the fourth amendment. When a continuous tap is placed
on a telephone, the eavesdropper almost inevitably hears all the
conversations of everyone who talks on that line whether the subject
calls out from the tapped number, calls in to that number, or is
called by someone using that phone, and no matter how irrelevant
or privileged the communication. A bug can be even more intrusive,
for it can catch every intimate, irrelevant, or privileged utterance
of each person in the room or area bugged. 13 Because these devices
remarks of Congressman Anderson, 114 CONG. R.Ec. 4633 (1968)] and was on the Senate
floor during the Senate debate [114 CoNG. R.Ec. 6031 (1968)]. He also served as the reporter for the ABA Advisory Committee on the Police Function, and prepared a bill
similar to title III for President Johnson's Crime Commission.
A somewhat shorter version of the eighty-six-page General Commentary to the
ABA Standards, virtually identical in argument, structure, and much of the language,
was prepared by Professor Blakey and appeared in a brief filed by the National
District Attorneys' Association in the Berger case. It is reprinted in Hearings Before
Subcomm. No. 5 of the House Judiciary Comm., 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 1055 (1967).
11. The Standards are of more than academic and background interest. Under
title III, state eavesdropping requires a specific state statute, and the Standards may
well be looked to as a model, except where their requirements are less restrictive than
those of title III.
12. In this discussion "eavesdropping" will refer to both wiretapping and bugging
unless otherwise indicated.
l!l. For example, the Government has admitted that it overheard five conversations
in which Muhammud Ali (Cassius Clay) participated, "at three places where electronic
surveillance against others was directed." Supporting Memorandum for the United
States at 1-2, Clay v. United States, 37 U.S.L.W. 3056 (U.S. May 6, 1968). For other examples, see Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961) (conversations throughout
the house overheard); Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128 (1954) (bedroom). See Williams,
The Wiretapping Problem: A. Defense Counsel's Yjew, 44 MINN. L. R.Ev. 855, 862-68
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intrude so deeply and so grossly, they discourage people from speaking freely; as Justice Brennan has warned, if these devices proliferate widely, we may find ourselves in a society where the only sure
way to guard one's privacy "is to keep one's mouth shut on all
occasions. " 14
The possibility of such indiscriminate surveillance was one of
the principal reasons for which the Supreme Court struck down a
New York eavesdropping statute in Berger v. New Y ork.16 The statute
at issue in Berger, section 813-a of the New York Code of Criminal
Procedure, authorized eavesdropping for periods up to sixty days
on the basis of a sworn statement
that there is reasonable ground to believe that evidence of crime
may be thus obtained, and particularly describing the person or
persons whose communications, conversations or discussions are to
be overheard or recorded and the purpose thereof, and ... identifying the particular telephone number or telegraph line involved.16

An unlimited number of sixty-day extensions were permitted. In
Berger, eavesdropping had been authorized under this statute for a
four-month period on the offices of two suspects-one of whom was
a lawyer-in a state liquor authority bribery case.
The Supreme Court, stressing that the inherently broad intrusion
of electronic eavesdropping made the fourth amendment's particularity requirements "especially" important, 17 set down constitutional
requirements to prevent such overbroad intrusions. These requirements were drawn largely from the Court's previous discussion of
the eavesdropping procedures in Osborn v. United States. 18 As the
Court emphasized, the recording device in Osborn was used by a
party to the conversation who was engaged in the investigation of
"a specific criminal offense," and the eavesdropping was restricted
to the "limited purpose outlined in" an antecedent judicial order;
the type of conversation was described with particularity so that
(1960). Other arguments based on the fifth amendment and the mere-evidence rule have
been rejected either impliedly [see Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966)], or explicitly [Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 44 n.2 (1967)].
14. Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 450 (1963). See also Kalven, Privacy in the
Year 2000 in Symposium, Toward the Year 2000: Work in Progress, DAEDALUS 876,
882 (1967): "It may be a final ironic commentary on how badly things will have become by 2000 when some men will make a fortune merely by providing, on a monthly,
weekly, daily, or even hourly basis, a room of one's own."
15. 388 U.S. 41 (1967). There were other reasons as well, such as a lack of requirements of notice to the victim of the eavesdropping and of a return to the judge of
what was overheard. 388 U.S. at 58-60.
16. N.Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. § 813-a (1958).
17. 388 U.S. at 56. See also 388 U.S. at 68, 69 Gustice Stewart, concurring).
18. 385 U.S. 323 (1966).
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"the officer could not search unauthorized areas"; the investigator
would have to end the intrusion "once the property sought, and for
which the order was issued, was found." Furthermore,
the order authorized one limited intrusion rather than a series or
continuous surveillance. . . . [A] new order was issued when the
officer sought to resume the search and probable cause was shown
for the succeeding one. Moreover, the order was executed by the
officer with dispatch, not over a prolonged and extended period.
• • •19

Although Osborn involved the recording of a conversation by one
who was participating in it, which was of course easy to describe
with particularity in advance, the Berger Court seemed to attach no
significance to this distinction. Rather, it implied that the procedures used in Osborn should be followed in all cases, even where
none of the parties had consented to the interception.
Measured by these standards, the New York statute fell far short:
to the Court, the statute authorized "general searches by electronic
devices," in violation of the .Marron rule prohibiting "the seizure of
one thing under a warrant describing another." 20 The statute did
not require the applicant to describe "the 'property' sought, the
conversations," with particularity, and this gave the officer "a roving
commission to 'seize' any and all conversations." Furthermore, authorization for a two-month period was impermissible:
[Such surveillance] is the equivalent of a series of intrusions,
searches and seizures pursuant to a single showing of probable cause.
Prompt execution is also avoided. During such a long and continuous
(24 hours a day) period the conversations of any and all persons coming into the area covered by the device will be seized indiscriminately
and without regard to their connection with the crime under investigation .... [T]he statute places no termination date on the eavesdrop once the conversation sought is seized. This is left entirely to
the discretion of the officer.21
In sum, the Court concluded that the New York statute permitted
"a blanket grant of permission to eavesdrop . . . without adequate
judicial supervision or protective procedures." 22
The Court's subsequent decision in Katz v. United States underscored this concern for particularity by approving, in dictum, an
extremely narrow intrusion. In Katz, FBI agents had probable
cause to believe that the defendant was using certain public tele19.
20.
21.
22.

!188 U.S. at 57.
Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 196 (1927), quoted in 388 U.S. at 58.
!188 U.S. at 58-60.
!188 U.S. at 60.
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phones for gambling purposes about the same time almost every day.
Thereafter,
[e]ach day, as petitioner approached a certain spot about a block
and a half from the telephones, agents in a radio car surveilling
petitioner signaled other agents near the booths, who then attached
and activated the recorder and microphones [on two booths]. After
petitioner departed, the device was removed. . . .2s
Six recordings were made and used. Of this procedure the Court said:
[T]his surveillance was so narrowly circumscribed that a duly authorized magistrate ... clearly apprised of the precise intrusion . . .
could constitutionally have authorized, with appropriate safeguards,
the very limited search and seizure that the Government asserts
in fact took place.24
Purportedly in compliance with the guidelines set out in these
cases, title III of the Crime Control Act authorizes electronic surveillance for thirty days, with the possibility of an unlimited number
of thirty-day extensions, if a judge makes an ex parte determination
that:
(a) there is probable cause £or belief that an individual is committing, has committed, or is about to commit a particular offense
enumerated in section 2516 of this chapter;
(b) there is probable cause for belief that particular communications concerning that offense will be obtained through such
interception;
(c) normal investigative procedures have been tried and have
failed or reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or
to be too dangerous;
(d) there is probable cause for belief that the facilities from
which, or the place where, the wire or oral communications are to
be intercepted are being used, or are about to be used, in connection with the commission of such offense, or are leased to, listed
in the name of, or commonly used by such person.25
The ABA Standards contain similar provisions.26
Under the principles announced in Berger, Katz, and Osborn,
both title III and the ABA Standards contain serious constitutional
infirmities with respect to the duration of the eavesdropping and
the required particularity of the order authorizing it.
23. Brief for Respondent at 3-4, United States v. Katz, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (em•
phasis added).
24. 389 U.S. at 354. Because no warrant had been obtained for such surveillance, it
was ruled illegal despite its compliance with particularity requirements. 389 U.S. at
358.
25. Act § 2518(3).
26. ABA STANDARDS §§ 5.1-5.11.
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I. Time
Both title III and the Standards authorize continuous eavesdropping for potentially unlimited periods of time. Section 2518(5)
of the Crime Control Act permits eavesdropping for an initial period
of thirty days with an unlimited number of thirty-day extensions on
renewed showings of probable cause. Allowing such lengthy surveillance, possibly for years, conflicts sharply with Berger's clear disapproval of the two-month authorization permitted by the New York
statute.27 Moreover, sections 2518 (l)(d) and 4(e) of the Act do not
limit the eavesdropping to specific points in time, unlike the court
orders upheld in Katz and the cases approvingly cited in Berger, 28
but rather allow uninterrupted eavesdropping over a "period of
time." Under such a provision, officers may install a tap or a bug
which will be in continuous operation throughout the days or months
for which the interception is authorized. This would seem to pose a
rather clear conflict with the Supreme Court's holding in Berger,
which disapproved the uninterrupted interception as allowing "indiscriminate" seizure and approved the Osborn interception because "the order authorized one limited intrusion rather than ...
a continuous surveillance."29
The legislative history and ABA commentary approve such
lengthy and continuous eavesdropping for, as the Senate Reports puts
it,
27. Section 5.9 of the Standards contains similar authority except that the initial
period is fifteen days, though the extensions may be for thirty. The Standards add a
requirement that where such extended overhearing is contemplated, there must be a
showing that the suspect is engaged "over a period of time in the commission of a
particular offense with two or more close associates as part of a continuing criminal
activity." § 5.4(i)(A). Apart from the obvious vagueness of "close associates" and
"continuing criminal activity," there seems to be no indication in Berger or elsewhere
that suspects in a three-man conspiracy case involving several criminal acts are entitled to fewer constitutional protections than others; Berger itself involved a multiperson conspiracy. Indeed electronic eavesdropping is supposed to be uniquely valuable
for such offenses and usually restricted to them. Were the Standards approach adopted
the exception would become the rule.
Also, one might ask how much investigators will have to add to the initial showing
to justify the extension. For an indication that eavesdropping for extended periods of
time is not uncommon see text accompanying notes 30-31, 65 infra.
28. 388 U.S. at 63:
[T]his Court has in the past under specific conditions and circumstances, sustained the use of eavesdropping devices. See Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S.
129 [1942]; On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747 [1952]; Lopez v. United States,
supra; and Osborn v. United States, supra.
29. 388 U.S. at 57. For similar conclusions, see The Supreme Court, 1967 Term, 82
HARV. L. REv. 63, 195-96 (1968). Cf. Dash, Katz-Variations on a Theme by Berger, 17
CATHOLIC U. L. REv. 296, 312-13 (1968). The Department of Justice takes a similarly
narrow view. See 114 CONG. REc. 6216, Comment on Amend. No. 765 (May 23, 1968).
See also H. Schwartz, Electronic Eavesdropping: What the Supreme Court Did Not Do
4 CRIM. L. Bou.. 83 (1968).
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[w]here it is necessary to obtain coverage to [sic] only one meeting,
the order should not authorize additional surveillance.... Where a
course of conduct embracing multiple parties and extending over a
period of time is involved, the order may properly authorize proportionately longer surveillance but in no event longer than 30 days,
unless extensions are granted.80
As authority and illustration of the "proportionately longer surveillance" for "conduct extending over a period of time," the Senate
Report cites People v. Tarantino, 31 a case involving fifteen months
of continuous interception during which "police listened to every
sound that was made in defendant's [hotel] room ... [although they]
did not consider all of the conversations they overheard relevant ...";
the result was a set of recordings that totalled "approximately 500
hours of listening time.'' 32 This example seems inconsistent with
Berger's condemnation of lengthy, continuous surveillance. The Standards do additional violence to Berger by citing the eavesdropping
in that case as an example of the kind of continuous overhearing that
the ABA Advisory Committee seeks to authorize,33 even though
Berger itself squarely condemned that surveillance as too lengthy
and indiscriminate.34
A possible limitation on the length of the surveillance might
result from a requirement that the interception end when a conversation of the type sought is first obtained. The Supreme Court
in Berger criticized the New York statute for failing to prevent a
police officer, in his untrammeled discretion, from continuing to
listen even after he had obtained what he was looking for. 30 Sections 2518 (l)(d) and (4)(e) of title III take away the officer's discretion, but still permit continued listening if a judge authorizes it
upon a showing of "probable cause to believe that additional communications of the same type will appear." Such a limitation is of
course no limitation at all, for where there is probable cause of a
continuing offense, almost inevitably there is a probable cause to
believe that there will be more than one relevant conversation.
The possibility of a warrant authorizing a number of interceptions may conflict with Berger in yet another respect. There, the
30. S. REP. No. 1097 at 101. Cf. ABA STANDARDS 148, which uses virtually identical
language.
31. 45 Cal. 2d 590, 290 P.2d 505 (1955). The evidence in Tarantino was excluded,
however, because it was obtained without prior approval of a magistrate.
32. 45 Cal. 2d at 593, 290 P.2d at 508.
33. ABA STANDARDS § 5.9, comment.
34. 388 U.S. at 57; see text accompanying note 28.
35. 388 U.S. at 57, 59.
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Court seemed to require that each order be limited to one interception; it disapproved a "series of intrusions, searches and seizures,
pursuant to a single showing of probable cause."36 The Berger
Court's implied approval of Osborn, where the Federal Bureau of
Investigation had obtained a new order for a second interception
made only a day after the original interception, reinforces this reading.37 Dictum in Katz, however, seems to approve a surveillance involving six different interceptions on several different days.38 This
particular point was not argued in Katz, and the issue of whether
one order can authorize several interceptions remains in doubt. But
even if Katz did supersede Berger in this respect, the "narrowly circumscribed" surveillance over a period of several days that was approved in Katz is a far cry from the continuous series of intrusionspossibly lasting for years-authorized by title III.39
2. Particularity of the Warrant Description
Given the possibility of such long-term eavesdropping, Berger's
requirement that the "property" sought-the conversation-be described with particularity in the warrant becomes all the more important, at least theoretically. The wider the possible temporal or
spatial area of a permissible search, the more important it is that
the description of what is sought be precise, for imposing such a
limitation may be the only way to discourage indiscriminate searches
of extensive areas. Yet the practical value of such a limitation may
be rather feeble. Where eavesdropping continues for a long time, a
particularized description of the conversation in the warrant is not
likely to limit the intrusion very much, especially since indirect
use of the evidence is hard to detect. 40 In some instances, however,
the eavesdropping may not be continuous, but rather may be limited
to a specific described conversation or conversations as in Katz and
similar cases. Moreover, even if lengthy eavesdropping is statutorily
permitted, the exclusion of evidence obtained directly or indirectly
36. 388 U.S. at 59.
37. This interpretation is further reinforced by the fact that the second interception
was necessitated solely by the failure of the recording device to operate properly the
first time, surely a reasonable justification for trying again without seeking a new
order.
38. See Brief, supra note 23, at 3-4.
39. Section 2518(5) of title III may also offend Berger's condemnation of orders
which are not promptly executed. Cf. Sgro v. United States, 287 U.S. 206 (1932). The
thirty-day period apparently need not start promptly, nor within ten days as is required
with a conventional warrant; rather, execution is to take place "as soon as practicable." See also ABA STANDARDS § 5.9.
40. See discussion below at text accompanying notes 152-57.
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from conversations that are not specified in advance might discourage
some eavesdropping; if less evidence can be used, there may be less
incentive to listen. Thus, a strictly construed and enforced particularity requirement might provide some limitation, although not
much optimism on this score is warranted.
Such a strict particularity requirement could exclude two types
of nonspecified evidence: undescribed evidence of the crime being
investigated, and evidence of other crimes.41 Title III does not seem
to exclude either kind, although the text of the statute is not entirely
clear. As to the nonspecified evidence of a specified crime, sections
2518(4)(c) and (e) require a description of the "type of communication sought to be intercepted." If "type of communication" is construed broadly, as the Standards at least seem to suggest,42 then little
evidence relating to the offense in question will be excluded. Such
a broad interpretation may run afoul of Berger, however. There
Justice Clark, writing for the majority, stressed that "the need for
particularity ... is especially great in the case of eavesdropping."43
His meaning may be explained by his citation of Osborn, Goldman,
Lopez, and On Lee as examples of specificity, for, as his discussion in
the accompanying footnote demonstrates, all four cases involved
quite detailed advance knowledge and description of the anticipated
contents of the conversations, of the crime and persons involved,
and of the place and time of interception.44 The facts and language
in Katz also point toward such a meticulous construction of the particularity requirement. 45
41. See Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 196 (1927), for an example of the
first kind, and Seymour v. United States, 369 F.2d 825 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 386
U.S. 897 (1966) for an example of the second.
42. The Standards require only "a specification of the particular offense ••• under
investigation," ABA STANDARDS § 5.3(iii). This is elaborated in the commentary by
"that is, the type of conversation to be intercepted." Id. at 137. This identification
is contrary to the requirements of Berger: specification of both the offense and the
communication (388 U.S. at 58-59), the same requirements found in § 2518(4)(c) of
title III.
43. 388 U.S. at 56.
44. In Osborn, in which James Hoffa's lawyer was convicted of attempted jurytampering, the eavesdropping consisted of an informer's secret recording of his own
planned conversation with the suspect. This was also true in Lopez, another case cited in
Berger. In On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747 (1952), an informer wore a radio
transmitter to broadcast his conversations with a specific suspect. And in Goldman v.
United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942), also cited, the FBI's detectaphone was installed in
order to overhear four conversations to which an FBI informer was a party, and which
may actually have been set up by him.
At one point, Berger does refer to "type of conversation," 388 U.S. at 57, but this
is in a discussion of the very specific and limited set of circumstances in Osborn.
45. Steele v. United States, 267 U.S. 498 (1925), cited by the ABA as authority for
very broad specification (ABA STANDARDS 90 n.256), is a rather special case. A prohibition agent saw some cases stencilled "whiskey" being loaded into a building and he
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Title III offers little direct guidance as to how broadly "type of
communication" should be interpreted, except that apparently the
description must include more than a reference to the particular
offense, since this is separately required by section 2518(l)(b). Even
if it is read narrowly, however, the statute would still allow the police
to listen for all conversations that fit the description of the type specified in the order, under the sections discussed in the preceding
paragraph, and this seems to be less than the kind of particularity
that is impliedly required by Berger and Katz.
Moreover, if one may judge from the latitude allowed police
officers with respect to conversations about nonspecified offenses, it
is unlikely that a narrow construction of "type of communication"
was intended. Section 2517(5) expressly permits retroactive judicial
ratification of the seizure of evidence of other offenses if the evidence
was obtained by a legal interception, which completely ignores the
thrust of the Supreme Court's holding in Marron prohibiting "seizure of one thing under a warrant describing another." 46 Instead of
the more meticulous particularity for electronic eavesdropping that
is required by Berger, the Crime Control Act demands less particularity than is usually imposed to secure the conventional warrant.
Title III is not of course unique in ignoring Marron. Despite
the Supreme Court's invocation of the case in Berger and elsewhere,
the lower courts have largely disregarded it. 47 They have been reluctant to force officers to obtain a new and separate warrant in order
to seize unanticipated items seen in the course of a legitimate entry
and search. This is not entirely unreasonable if the initial intrusion
is proper. After all, the invasion of privacy has already occurred, and
legitimately, so why exclude any items seized as a result? Though
this argument may sound superficially plausible, it ignores the most
obtained a warrant for "cases of whiskey.'' When a large seizure was made under the
warrant, the Court easily found that the specificity was adequate. Given the nature
of the commodity-fungible cases of whiskey-it is difficult to see how more specificity
was physically possible. This is a far cry from specifying conversations which vary
sharply as among different people, times, and subject matter, inter alia.
There is also some question whether the "especially great" particularity which is
required where electronic eavesdropping is concerned (388 U.S. at 56) does not independently make Steele inapplicable, even if that case were generally more apposite,
especially in view of the threat to free speech from electronic surveillance; cf. Stanford
v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476 (1965) (more particularity required where first amendment
implicated in seizure); Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. at 469-71 Gustice Brennan
dissenting). See text accompanying notes 80·81.
46. Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 196 (1927), is cited in Berger, 388 U.S. at 58.
47. See, e.g., United States v. Eisner, 297 F.2d 595 (6th Cir. 1962); Johnson v. United
States, 293 F.2d 539 (D.C. Cir. 1961). Contra, United States v. Coots, 196 F. Supp. 775
(E.D. Tenn. 1961).
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important rationale for the Marron rule: curtailing intrusive conduct
by reducing the incentive for an extension of such conduct. Were
the Marron limitation abolished, all searches and seizures would
verge on the general, so long as the initial entry was legitimate; there
would be no reason to stop the search, even after the described item
was seized, since everything else that was found could be used in a
subsequent prosecution.
3. Eavesdropping on Privileged Communications
To illustrate further the indiscriminately broad sweep of the electronic surveillance now permitted, it might be well at this point to
discuss one of its more serious consequences: the interception of
privileged conversations. Professor Alan Westin's conclusion that
eavesdropping on lawyers is a "widespread practice"48 is partly confirmed by the fact that many of the electronic eavesdropping cases
that have been litigated involve eavesdropping on defense attorneys,
and by the many reports of advertent and inadvertent intrusions on
the communications of lawyers, doctors, and others.49 Even where
the police do not intend to eavesdrop on privileged conversations, it
will often be impossible to monitor out such communications; 50 and
it is really asking too much of human nature to expect that police
officers who are trying to put a suspect behind bars will refrain from
listening in on his efforts to frustrate them. 51
Title III reflects virtually no awareness of this problem, 52 but
the ABA Advisory Committee professes some concern and imposes
limitations. The Standards prohibit eavesdropping on
48. PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 125 (1967).
49. United States v. Roberts, 389 U.S. 18 (1967); Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41
(1967); O'Brien v. United States, 386 U.S. 345 (1967); Osborn v. United States, 385
U.S. 323 (1966); Black v. United States, 385 U.S. 26 (1966): United States v. Goldman,
316 U.S. 129 (1942); People v. Morhouse, 21 N.Y.2d 66, 286 N.Y.S.2d 657, 233 N.E.2d
705 (1967): United States v. Coplon, 191 F.2d 749, 757 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
The widespread use of such surveillance in abortion investigations [see, e.g., People
v. Scharfstein, 52 Misc. 2d 976, 277 N.Y.S.2d 516 (1967); People v. Cohen, 248 N.Y.S.2d
339 (1964); People v. Scardaccione, 243 N.Y.S.2d 721 (1963)] often produces eaves•
dropping on physician-patient conversations.
50. Hearings on S. Res. 190 Before Subcomm. on Administrative Practices and
Procedures of Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 170-74
(1967) [hereinafter 1967 Long Committee Hearings] (testimony of Geoffrey Arn).
51. See cases cited in note 49 supra; United States v. Johnson, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948).
But see People v. Morhouse (Sup. Ct. N.Y., Nov. 11, 1968), in N.Y. Times, Nov. 12,
1968, at 1, col. 2, where it was found that police refrained from listening, following
remand for hearing on this point in People v. Morhouse, 21 N.Y.2d 66, 233 N.E.2d 705,
286 N .Y.S.2d 657 (1967).
52. The sole consideration appears in § 2517(4) which maintains the privilege of
any otherwise privileged communications.
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a facility or in a place primarily used by licensed physicians, licensed lawyers, or practicing clergymen or in a place used primarily
for habitation by husband and wife unless an additional showing
... is made ... that(i) the overhearing or recording will be or was made in such
manner so as to eliminate or minimize insofar as practicable the
overhearing or recording of other communications whose overhearing or recording are not or would not be authorized and
(ii) there is or was a special need for overhearing or recording of the communications over the facilities. 63

This limitation, which also applies to eavesdropping on public
facilities such as telephones, is a verbal placebo. The "additional
showing" requirement adds little: minimizing the chances of intercepting "innocent" calls should, one would think, be required in
all interceptions, as indeed it is in the Crime Control Act. 154 Furthermore, according to the only example given in the Standards, 65 the
"special need" test is apparently satisfied simply by a showing that the
facility in question and not another is being used for illegal purposes;
again, one would expect this to be a requirement for all interceptions.
We are assured that this Standard must be "scrupulously met." 56
Does this imply that the other Standards need not be? And what is
"scrupulous compliance" in contrast to less than "scrupulous" compliance?
There are alternative approaches to this problem. Could we not
try to exclude entirely such privileged areas and communications
from legalized eavesdropping? If these privileges are indeed crucial to
the high purposes for which they were created-especially the constitutionally hallowed and ancient attorney-client relationship57-then
legislation that is as experimental as the Crime Control Act and the
Standards purport to be58 need not include them among the possible
areas of interception. If we cannot prove the over-all benefit of eaves53. ABA STANDARDS §§ 5.ll(a), 5.10, respectively (combined to incorporate a cross
reference in § 5.11).
54. Act § 2518(5): "Every order and extension thereof shall contain a provision
that the authorization to intercept shall be e.xecuted as soon as practicable, shall be
conducted in such a way as to minimize the interception of communications not
otherwise subject to interception under this chapter ••.."
55. ABA STANDARDS § 5.10, comment: "Second, a special need to tap the phone
must be shown. For example, where a professional gambler is conducting his business
not over his private phone, but over a particular public phone, there exists a special
need to make interceptions over that phone."
56. Id. § 511, comment b.
57. In addition to this obvious example, it is worth noting that priest-penitent
surveillance might raise first amendment problems.
58. See ABA STANDARDS 51-52; S. REP. No. 1097, at 107.
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dropping without trying it, perhaps we should not authorize so
serious and probable an invasion of privacy until at least some of
the evidence is in. 59
Another possible method of reducing intrusion upon attorneyclient communications is to prohibit post-indictment eavesdropping. The Standards expressly permit this kind of surveillance
and title III is silent on this point, thereby not proscribing it. Yet
once a man has been indicted, experience shows that there is a good
chance that electronic eavesdropping on him will result in the interception of attorney-client discussions60 or other conversations relating
to his defense. 61 Indeed, Jl.1.assiah v. United States, 62 however narrowly
it is read, seems to prohibit this kind of post-indictment investigation when it relates to the particular offense under indictment.
Eavesdropping on matters already under indictment, especially in
cases in which information relating to the defense cannot practicably
be eliminated, would seem to be as much an interference with the
right to counsel as surreptitious interrogation of the defendant, and
it should be subject to the same post-indictment prohibition. Such a
ban might, if enforced, prevent at least some invasions of attorneyclient conferences.
4. "Strategic Intelligence" and Specific Crimes
The fact that neither title III nor the Standards meet some of
the fundamental restrictions imposed by Berger and Katz is not
altogether surprising, for adherence to these limitations would seriously reduce the allegedly unique value of electronic surveillance:
its ability to obtain "strategic intelligence" for the war against
organized crime. Yet the Act's own restriction of electronic surveillance to the investigation of one of the specific offenses listed
in section 2516 which "has been, is being, or is about to be committed" also severely reduces its usefulness in obtaining such "strategic intelligence." Since this restriction is clear and cannot be easily
evaded by verbal manipulation, title III will turn out to be either
a provision of relatively little value in the struggle against organized
crime or a verbal smoke screen for continuing illegality.
According to its proponents, the special advantage of electronic
surveillance is that it is a valuable tool for gathering strategic intelli59. For some penetrating comments on action based on ignorance see Lehman,
Crime, the Public and the Crime Commission: A Critical Review of the Challenge of
Crime in a Free Society, 66 MICH. L. REv. 1487 (1968). See also part III infra.
60. See cases cited in note 49 supra.
61. See, e.g., Hoffa v. United States, 402 F.2d 380 (7th Cir. 1968).
62. 377 U.S. 201 (1964); see also Beatty v. United States, 389 U.S. 45 (1967).

January 1969]

Electronic Eavesdropping

469

gence about organized crime and that it thus enables law enforcement officials to obtain "a look at the overall picture" for "prevention" purposes. 63 The techniques of fighting organized crime differ
from those used in ordinary criminal investigation. The former
involves accumulating a great deal of superficially irrelevant information which is then collated. Furthermore, in investigating
organized crime the police do not work from a known crime to an
unknown or suspected criminal, but "backwards," from a "known
criminal" to a hoped-for discovery of an as-yet-unknown crime. 64
As Professor Blakey testified before the Senate Judiciary Committee:
The normal criminal situation deals with an incident, a murder, a rape, or a robbery, probably committed by one person. The
criminal investigation normally moves from the known crime toward
the unknown criminal. This is in sharp contrast to the type of procedures you must use in the investigation of organized crime. Here
in many situations you have known criminals but unknown crimes.
So it is necessary to subject the known criminals to surveillance,
that is, to monitor their activities. It is necessary to identify their
criminal and noncriminal associates; it is necessary to identify their
areas of operation, both legal and illegal. Strategic intelligence attempts to paint this broad, overall picture of the criminal's activities in order that an investigator can ultimately move in with a
specific criminal investigation and prosecution. . . . Perhaps the
best illustration I can give you is the "airtels", ... [which] represent
the gathering of strategic intelligence against organized crime in
that case against Raymond Patriarca.
Tactical intelligence, on the other hand, is illustrated by the
Osborn case, which the Supreme Court heavily relied upon in the
Berger opinion. You moved in there and monitored only one conversation or only one meeting. You had a limited, tactical purpose,
whereas in the Patriarca situation you had a broader purpose.... So
the distinction deals, first, with the purpose of the agency and then
perhaps, second, with the extent of time the subject is under surveillance.65
63. Blakey, Aspects of the Evidence Gathering Process in Organized Crime Cases: A
Preliminary Analysis, app. C to PRESIDENT'S COMMlSSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT
AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT ON ORGANIZED CRIME 80, 92 (1967)
(hereinafter TASK FORCE ON ORGANIZED CRIME].
64. See, e.g., Baker v. United States, 401 F.2d 958 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (surveillance of
Fred Black, as explained by FBI agents).
65. Hearings on Controlling Crime Through More Effective Law Enforcement Be-

fore the Subcomm. on Criminal Laws and Procedures of the Senate Judiciary Comm.,
90th Cong., 1st Sess. 957-58 (1967) (hereinafter 1967 Senate Crime Hearings] (testimony
of Prof. G. Robert Blakey).
An example of an "intelligence investigation" appears in the testimony dealing with
electronic surveillance given by Dean Elson, Special Agent in Charge of the Las Vegas
Field Office of the FBI in Transcript of Testimony at 749, United States v. Drew, Cr.
No. 1333 (D. Nev., Feb. 1968):
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Strategic information does not, of course, come immediately: the
Patriarca "airtels" cover more than three years; the Berger bug was
in operation for four months; in one of the Hoffa cases, surveillance of a codefendant lasted eighteen months, including six months
after indictment; 66 in the California case of People v. Tarantino,
which was cited with apparent approval by the Senate Judiciary
Committee in its report on title III, the interception continued
for fifteen months; and the eavesdropping which intercepted boxing
champion Muhammed Ali's conversation while he was being investigated for draft evasion also lasted some fifteen months. 67 Thus, the
time limitations of Katz and Berger seem quite inconsistent with
this particular use of electronic surveillance.
Moreover, a vast number of people will inevitably be overheard
while the police are gathering strategic intelligence, and a substantial
number of these people will be overheard often. Many of these individuals will not be involved in criminality, but since organized
crime investigations usually involve the possible corruption of
respected community figures, suspicion will arise and their conversations will be intercepted. As noted above, the proponents of strategic intelligence claim that it is necessary to identify "criminal and
noncriminal associates ... [and] their areas of operation, both legal
and illegal."68
Q. • .. [D]o you want to explain really what you mean by that, and [sic]
intelligence type investigation?
A. We were interested in Mr. Drew from the standpoint of his activities, his
associates, who he was contacting in connection with organized crime and or•
ganized criminal activity. Our primary objective in the investigation was intelligence information just as it is in an espionage investigation.
There was no-at this stage of the investigation there is no violation within
the jurisdiction of the Bureau. It was purely an intelligence type of an investigation. [Emphasis added.]
Another example was given by New York District Attorney Frank S. Hogan: "We make it
a habit to keep track of these [notorious gangster] characters who return [from prison]
and surveillance, including wiretapping of Dio was undertaken, since he seemed to be
blossoming forth as a power in a number of labor unions." Hearings on Wiretapping
Before Subcomm. No. 5 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 321
(1955) [hereinafter 1955 House Hearings].
On the widespread use of general surveillance eavesdropping, see Hearings on
S. 1086 on Wiretapping and Eavesdropping Legislation Before the Subcommittee on
Constitutional Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 463
(1961) [hereinafter 1961 Senate Hearings] (testimony of Anthony Savarese); S. DASH,
R. KNOWLTON, & R. SCHWARTZ, THE EAVESDROPPERS 66, 163-65 (1959); cf. Report on
Certain Alleged Practices of the F.B.I., IO LAw. GUILD REv. 185, 187-89 (1950).
66. Hoffa v. United States, 402 F.2d 380 (7th Cir. 1968).
67. Supplemental Memorandum for the United States at 1-2, Clay v. United States,
37 U.S.L.W. 3056 (May 6, 1968).
68. 1967 Senate Crime Hearings 957 (emphasis added). See the testimony of Special
Agent Pennypacker of the FBI in Transcript of Proceedings at 610, United States v.
Black, Cr. Nos. 551-63, 650-63 (D.D.C., Dec. 18, 1967):
During the course of the investigation I might send a lead out to an office and
make reference to the fact previously it had been determined from several sources.
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Such broad-ranging surveillance is facilitated by section 2518(3)(d)
of title III, which authorizes eavesdropping on facilities and places
"leased to, listed in the name of, or commonly used by" the suspect,
and not merely on those facilities and places that are used primarily
by him. Thus, eavesdropping on the homes, offices, and telephone
communications of the suspect's relatives, friends, business partners,
and others is permitted, and Berger's implied disapproval of eavesdropping on people "without regard to their connection with the
crime under investigation" 69 is also ignored.
The fact is that searches for strategic intelligence, without a
specific crime as the objective, cannot be squared with Berger,
Katz, and Osborn. Judging by the language used by the Court,
the facts at issue in those cases, and the kinds of permissible electronic surveillance cited in the various opinions, it would seem that
gathering tactical intelligence is the only kind of surveillance that
is justifiable under present theories of the fourth amendment. And
in this respect, both title III and the Standards are verbally consistent with the cases in limiting eavesdropping to such tactical
intelligence purposes: under sections 2518(l)(b)(i) and 2518(3)(a)
of the Act, the applicant for an order must provide "details as to [a]
particular offense" listed in section 2516, while section 5.3(iii) of
the Standards requires "a specification of the particular offense
which is or was under investigation."
This is surely an odd result, for if the war against organized
crime-the justification for title III-really requires strategic intelligence, how will that war be advanced by legislation which seems
to permit the acquisition of only tactical intelligence? And if the
Act does not grant law enforcement officers the power to obtain
allegedly crucial strategic information, will we not again experience
the same kind of widespread fl.outing of clear legal limitations that
has recently come to light?70 In sum, even the very loose title III is
too restrictive to accomplish the purposes advanced by its proponents, and this raises serious questions about the reasons for their
One of the sources would be microphone surveillance, that a given named individual had been associated with Mr. Black, because this was my area of investigation, to determine who this individual was. Consequently the source of my
information to determine who this individual was would be from several sources
including this microphone surveillance, and it would become commingled
with other information. My purpose in sending leads out in the first place would
be to identify individuals which I had no identity for or I wanted to get additional background and we had a large number of people we had not identified
up to that point, so it would be a situation where I would be anxious and
interested.
69. Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 59 (1967).
70. See 1965 Long Committee Hearings 1212; text accompanying note ll0 infra.
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support of the legislation, and about how meaningful they expect
its ostensible limitations to be.
B. The Response to the Charge of Unconstitutional Generality
The legislative history of title III does not devote much space to
constitutional objections based on the theory that the statute allows
excessively long and indiscriminately general searches. Rather, it
simply claims compliance with Berger and Katz throughout.71 The
ABA Advisory Committee adopts a similar approach in some areas,
but it tries to meet the issue of indiscriminate searches more directly.
The response given by the Committee seems to come down to these
propositions: (1) The claim that a search by electronic eavesdropping
is especially indiscriminate ignores existing practice in more conventional searches for letters and other tangibles; such searches are (or
can be) just as indiscriminate, and yet they are legal. (2) Such breadth
is not repugnant to the Constitution, for the search may be general so
long as the seizure is specific. "All searches are general. Only seizures
are definite." 72 (3) As Justice Harlan suggests in his dissent to Berger,
"conversations are not 'seized' either by eavesdropping alone or by
their recording.... Just as some exercise of dominion, beyond mere
perception, is necessary for the seizure of tangibles, some use of the
conversations beyond the initial listening process is required for
[seizure of] the spoken word." 73 (4) The Harlan dissent is also correct
in contending that specification in the warrant of the "category" of
conversation is sufficient particularity-"The materials to be seized
are ... described with sufficient particularity if the warrant readily
permits their identification both by those entrusted with the warrant's
execution and by the court in any judicial proceeding." 74 (5) Economic regulation cases show the acceptance of very broadly drawn warrants, as do other precedents.
Some of the problems with the fourth proposition have already
been considered in the analysis of the meaning of "type of communication."75 It is necessary to add only that identification hardly seems
to be the sole purpose of the description, at least where the property
seized, as opposed to the premises searched, is concerned.76 Indeed,
See, e.g., S. REP. No. 1097 at 75, 97, 101, 102, 103, 105.
1967 Long Committee Hearings 434 (testimony of Prof. G. Robert Blakey).
ABA STANDARDS 90 (quoting from 388 U.S. at 98).
Id. at 89, 99, citing Steele v. United States, 267 U.S. 498, 504 (1925), discussed
in note 45 supra.
75. See text accompanying notes 42-45 supra.
76. Indeed, Justice Harlan notes (388 U.S. at 99) that his authority for the criterion
of sufficient particularity is derived from the discussion of the description of the
premises in Steele v. United States, 267 U.S. 498,503 (1925).
71.
72.
73.
74.
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a very broad description of the property to be seized is not necessarily
ambiguous; its very breadth may reduce any ambiguity by sweeping
in a great deal. Rather, the particularity requirement, when tied to
the predicate of probable cause, is designed to ensure that the police
know what they are looking for, that they have reason to expect it
to be where they are looking, and that they seek and seize nothing
else.77 Thus, the description in the Berger order permitting the recording of "any and all conversations, communications and discussions" taking place in a suspect's office for sixty days seems inadequately particularized, even if the warrant, which Justice Harlan
approved in Berger, makes it plain that the police can seize only
those conversations "relative to the payment of unlawful fees to
obtain liquor licenses." 78 Such a statement says nothing about the
conversation but only describes the offense; thus the warrant seems
very much like the old English general warrant which allowed general searches for "goods imported to the Colonies in violation of the
tax laws of the Crown." 79
Justice Harlan also explicitly dismisses any analogy between the
kind of eavesdropping that was at issue in Berger and the rationale
of Stanford v. Texas, 80 which required more scrupulous exactitude
in the warrant where confiscation of books was concerned because of
the first amendment implications of such a seizure. Yet, without expressly mentioning Stanford in this context, the majority in Berger
did state that "the need for particularity ... is especially great in the
case of eavesdropping," 81 thus impliedly rejecting Justice Harlan's
refusal to require an unusually high standard here.
Propositions nvo and three, which are clearly necessary to the
argument, also seem untenable. The second contention, that searches
may be general so long as seizures are specific, conflicts with the ABA
Advisory Committee's own statement elsewhere that it was "the hated
general searches" 82 which the fourth amendment was designed to
77. See United States v. Gable, 276 F. Supp. 555, 559 (E.D. Pa. 1967) ("[T]he
particularity requirement governs police conduct after the police have entered the
individual's zone of privacy ••. [and] prevents a general exploratory search by limit•
ing the officers' authority to search and seize.").
78. !188 U.S. at 99, 100.
79. Id. at 58. This type of warrant was condemned in Berger. See also Alioto v.
United States, 216 F. Supp. 48, 49 (E.D. Wis. 196!1) (warrant authorizing seizure of
"books and records" of certain businesses which were "harbored and concealed from
examination of the Internal Revenue Service ••• and which are instrumentalities of
crime" held to be too general).
80. !179 U.S. 476, 485 (1965), cited in !188 U.S. at 98; see disscussion in note 45 supra.
81. !188 U.S. at 56.
82. ABA STANDARDS § 5.6, comment c (emphasis added).
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prevent; and numerous decisions, including Berger itself,83 stress the
offensiveness of the search whether or not anything at all is seized.
The sole exception to this quite uniform condemnation appears in
cases involving a search incident to arrest, such as Harris v. United
States 84 and United States v. Rabinowitz,B 5 where the permitted
search for evidence of illegality was practically unlimited.B 6 The
anomaly of permitting such expansive powers where there is no warrant, while imposing strict limits of particularity on searches made
under a warrant, has often been noted. 87 What is important here,
however, is the fact that the broad scope of searches incident to arrest
has not been extended to searches under a warrant, whatever the
anomaly. Moreover, the Court's recent "stop and frisk" decisions,
which allow a limited self-protective search by a police officer who
has reason to believe that he or others are in danger during a policecitizen encounter, stressed the importance of limiting the scope of
the search by the purposes for which the search was allowed.BS
The third proposition-that merely "listening and recording"
is not a seizure-is inconsistent not only with the clear tenor of Berger,
but also with the even clearer language of Katz. The majority in
Berger stressed that the purpose of the fourth amendment is "to keep
the state out of constitutionally protected areas"; 89 moreover, its
reference to "the use of seized conversations" similarly implies that
conversations are seized before being used. Katz clinched this by
flatly stating that "[t]he government's activities in electronically
"listening to and recording the petitioner's words violated the privacy
upon which he justifiably relied ... and thus constituted a search
and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment." 90
The Harlan position on this issue must of course be accepted if
the specificity requirement is to be successfully evaded while retaining the ban on general searches. Justice Harlan pointed this out
himself in a passage in Berger that shows the inherent vice of electronic eavesdropping:
83. 388 U.S. at 58.
84. 331 U.S. 145 (1947).
85. 339 U.S. 56 (1950).
86. The sole criterion laid down by these cases is "reasonableness" with little
guidance on the criteria for a finding of "reasonableness." For reliance on Harris in a
related context see ABA STANDARDS § 5.6, comment c.
87. See Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 197-98 (1947) CTustice Jackson, dissenting);
Way, Increasing Scope of Search Incidental to Arrest, 1959 WASH. U. L.Q. 261;
Reynard, Freedom from Unreasonable Search and Seizure: A Second Class Constitutional Right?, 25 !ND. L.J. 259, 289-306 (1950).
88. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), citing in this connection the description of the
specificity of the search in United States v. Katz, 389 U.S. 347, 354-56 (1967).
89. 388 U.S. at 59.
90. 389 U.S. at 353 (emphasis added).
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If listening alone completes a "seizure," it would be virtually impossible for state authorities at a probable cause hearing to describe
with particularity the seizures which would later be made during
extended eavesdropping; correspondingly, seizures would unavoidably be made which lacked any sufficient nexus with the offenses
for which the order was first issued. Cf. Kremen v. United States,
353 U.S. 346 (1957); Warden v. Hayden 387 U.S. 294.91

The Kremen case, where government agents seized the entire contents of a house-including toiletries, Christmas cards, violin strings,
and pipe cleaners-is precisely in point for this kind of seizure; an
electronic interception maintained for any length of time seizes
everything that is uttered in the place that is bugged or over the telephone line that is tapped, with as little discrimination as the agents
showed in Kremen. 92 The Harlan-ABA approach to "seizure," apparently abandoned by Justice Harlan in Katz after it was flatly
rejected by the majority, 93 is incompatible with any meaningful right
of privacy. One whose intimate conversations with his wife are overheard is outraged not primarily because these conversations may be
recorded or used against him in court, but simply because they are
overheard.94 Whatever its psychological sources, the desire to be free
from intrusion exists regardless of how the fruits of the intrusion
are later used. Conversely, the voyeuristic impulse exists for its own
sake and demands immediate gratification independent of the purpose of acquiring a record to be used later.
It is true that most nontestimonial tangible evidence-narcotics,
policy slips, and weapons-is seized not by mere perception but
rather by being taken from the possessor's dominion. But different
principles apply to testimonial communications like conversations
and letters. Privacy is invaded at the point when the information in
such media is obtained by one not entitled to it, and this can easily
be by aural or visual perception. This much, at least, seems implied
91. 388 U.S. at 97-98.
92. Arguably, the government agents could refrain from listening to irrelevant or
privileged conversations, see People v. Morhouse, 21 N.Y.2d 66, 233 N.E.2d 705, 286
N.Y.S.2d 657 (1967) and United States v. Katz, 389 U.S. at 354 n.15 (1967). But in
organized crime investigations, where electronic eavesdropping is used in order to
obtain an "over-all picture," it is difficult to know what is irrelevant, especially where
the conversation is in a code. In any event, one must hear the entire conversation
before deciding [cf. People v. Tarantino, 45 Cal. 2d 590, 290 P.2d 505 (1955)] and
this hearing invades privacy. See text accompanying note 94 infra.
93. See 389 U.S. at 351-54.
94. See McDaniel v. Atlantic Coca Cola Bottling Co., Ga. App. 92, 2 S.E.2d 810,
816 (1939); Roach v. Harper, 143 W. Va. 869, 105 S.E.2d 564 (1958). See also cases
collected in Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REv. 383, 389-92 (1960). For a careful
analysis of this issue, see Josephson, Book Review, 15 UCLA L. REv. 1586 (1968).
The review also contains an illuminating exploration of many other basic issues in the
privacy area.
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by the quite far-reaching declaration in Katz that "the Fourth
Amendment protects people, not places. What a person . . . seeks
to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may
be constitutionally protected." 95 Where privacy is invaded by seeing
or listening, the search and seizure are identical and simultaneous,
and the Court has recognized this principle ever since it abandoned
the Olmstead theory that only tangibles are protected by the fourth
amendment. When someone wrongly intrudes and perceives something that the victim does not want disseminated, privacy is invaded
without more. 96
As to the fifth proposition and its reliance on the economic
regulation cases, these precedents are not especially pertinent: all
involve corporations or associations, and the fourth and fifth amendment rights of such entities have always been less than those of
natural persons.97 Furthermore, the economic regulation cases do not
involve warrants but subpoenas, which give the party an opportunity
to challenge the search before it is made. Thus, whatever limitations do exist can be effectively enforced, and there may be a tradeoff between the scope of the protection and its enforceability.
For these and other reasons, the following example given by the
ABA Advisory Committee to support the proposition that electronic
surveillance is not an indiscriminate search hardly seems persuasive:
Suppose, for example, a search warrant were issued for all copies
of a certain multi-copy letter or document thought to be located in
a specified building. To find all copies of the letter or document,
the officer executing the search warrant would have to examine every
piece of paper on the premises which might reasonably be the specified letter or document. No piece of paper on the premises that
might reasonably be the specified letter or document could go unexamined or unread, no matter who wrote it or however innocent,
privileged or intimate its contents. Depending on the scope of the
files, this might entail going over correspondence covering several
years in time. Only after all are initially "searched" would it be possible to make the ultimately discriminate "seizures" which were
constitutionally authorized by warrant.98
For one thing, this hardly seems like a typical case: police do not
usually go hunting for all copies of one letter. Moreover, it is dif95. 389 U.S. at 351-52.
96. Cf. Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128 (1954), in which use of electronically intercepted conversations in court was not prohibited but the interception itself was found
to be a violation of the fourth and fourteenth amendments. In Katz, the Court referred
to "listening and recording" (389 U.S. at 353) (emphasis added), but it is hard to believe
that the recording was essential to the seizure.
97. See Reynard, supra note 87, at 286-89.
98. ABA STANDARDS 89.
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ficult to believe that such wholesale rummaging would be upheld.
As noted, the Court's recent decision in Terry reflected much concern over the permissible limits of a search, and in light of this concern, it is difficult to believe that the Court would permit the wholesale intrusion that the example entails. Kremen, discussed above,
also implies such a prohibition. Furthermore, why does the example
assume that it is necessary to read all the way through every piece of
paper to find the specified document? Once the relevant document
is identified, it should be easy for the officer to avoid reading even
a part of the other papers.99 Finally, it is questionable whether even
under Warden v. Hayden the police can read all of such documents,
for in some cases the paper may be "testimonial" and possibly protected.100
Here, too, the Harris case may cut the other way, since it allowed
a substantial amount of rummaging in a search incident to an
arrest-not unlike the kind of search described in the ABA illustration. But for the reasons discussed earlier, Harris, which allowed
a general search for unspecified evidence, seems a dubious precedent
for a search warrant situation in which the importance of an especially high standard of particularity has just been asserted.101
III. THE

A.

ANTICIPATED EXTENT OF LEGALIZED EAVESDROPPING

The Extent of Eavesdropping Prior to Title III

The eavesdropping authorized by title III will be not only indiscriminate in character but also frequent in incidence. Its muchproclaimed almost magical potency102 alone would lead one to
expect that the police will want to use it regularly. Nevertheless,
we are assured that despite its great value, eavesdropping has been
and will be rarely used, 103 and that strict judicial supervision will
ensure such restraint. Unfortunately, neither past experience nor
future probabilities justify much hope here, whether the restraint
is enforced internally or externally.
That electronic eavesdropping has been widespread--even when
99. This could apply to listening as well as reading, except that the combination of a lack of limiting specification in the authorization (see part II.A. supra) and
the desire to learn everything about the suspect, both peculiarly relevant to electronic
eavesdropping, will deter such self-discipline. See note 92 supra.
100. See Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967) (Chief Justice Warren and Justice
Fortas concurring).
101. See text accompanying notes 83-88.
102. Frank S. Hogan frequently refers to electronic surveillance as "the single most
valuable weapon in fighting organized crime." See, e.g., Hearings on S. 2813 and S. 1195
Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 172 (1962).
103. ABA STANDAIIDS 45-47.
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unmistakably illegal-has often been verified; the hearings of Senator Edward V. Long's Senate Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure and Professor Alan Westin's study104 are only
the most recent examples. Instances of abuse in the practice of
electronic surveillance have included eavesdropping directed against
those suspected of minor offenses, 105 civil rights activists, 106 and suspected subversives.107 The use of either phony or patently inadequate affidavits has also been common.108 Recently, Internal Revenue
Service Commissioner Sheldon Cohen admitted that IRS agents had
knowingly violated the law in organized crime investigations,1° 0 and
that the IRS had actually run a school for eavesdropping.110 Such
illegalities, as well as others committed by the FBI, have jeopardized
numerous convictions.111 Many of these cases involved eavesdropping
on attorney-client conferences and other defense-related activities,
notably in conference rooms provided by the IRS; 112 bugs have also
been placed in the offices of lawyers whose only suspected offense
was that their clients were under investigation. 113 In one extreme
104. PRIVACY AND FREEDOM (1967). For an earlier extensive report see S. DASH, R.
KNOWLTON, & R. SCHWARTZ, THE EAVESDROPPERS (1959).
105. See remarks of Justice Hofstadter, In re Interception of Telephone Communications, 207 Misc. 69, 136 N.Y.S.2d 612, 613 (Sup. Ct. 1955). One survey found
that 30% of the police departments polled used eavesdropping "whenever possible";
in all 80% made some use of it. ';['his was true for communities of all types and sizes.
The New York City police use it primarily for small-time gambling and prostitution.
A. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM [hereinafter PRIVACY AND FREEDOM] 127-28. See also
1967 Long Committee Hearings 261 (testimony of Vincent Piersante).
106. Baton-Rouge State Times, Oct. 23, 1961, at 1, col. 3.
107. These have included eavesdropping on the W.E.B. DuBois Clubs and others;
see Theoharis & Meyer, The "National Security" Justification for Electronic Eavesdropping: An Elusive Exception, 14 WAYNE L. REv. 749, 760-62, especially 762 n.66,
and 768 n.100 (1968).
108. See In re Interception of Telephone Communications, 207 Misc. 69, 136
N.Y.S.2d 612, 613 (Sup. Ct. 1955); S. DASH, R. KNOWLTON & R. SCHWARTZ, THE
EAVESDROPPERS 56 (1959); note 142 infra.
109. Kenworthy, Tax Chief Admits 8-year Bugging, N.Y. Times, July 13, 1967, at
26, col. l; Officials Concede U.S. Revenue Men Used Wiretapping, N.Y. Times, July
14, 1965, at 1, col. 3. Yet in 1964, the Internal Revenue Service flatly denied that it
did any wiretapping and issued directives against it. PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 122-23;
1965 Long Committee Hearings 1198-99. The FBI was also caught lying about the
number and types of eavesdropping it engaged in, particularly in its oft-repeated claim
that FBI wiretapping was limited to national security cases. Compare PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 119-21 with Hearings Pursuant to S. Res. 62 on Wiretapping, Eavesdropping, and
the Bill of Rights Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Comm.
on the Judiciary, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 5, at 1481-82 (1959) (letters of former
Attorney General William P. Rogers), 1961 Senate Hearings, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 363
(1961) (testimony of former Assistant Attorney General Herbert Miller).
110. 1965 Long Committee Hearings 1212.
111. The figure has been estimated to be as high as sixty. Theoharis & Meyer,
supra note 107, at 766 n.90.
112. 1967 Long Committee Hearings 122.
113. Lawyer's Office Bugged by FBI, N.Y. Times, Dec. 11, 1966, § 1, at 148, col. 3.
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example that occurred a few years ago, Detroit police allegedly wiretapped every public telephone in police headquarters114-almost
certainly an intrusion upon lawyer-client conversations.
New York County District Attorney Frank Hogan has indeed
testified that he seeks very few orders and that there are no abuses
in New York County.ms But even the sympathetic ABA Advisory
Committee could not quite swallow the latter claim, for a report
issued in the late 1950's by a New York state legislative committee
which strongly favored wiretapping conceded that there had been
serious abuses. 116 Mr. Hogan's contention that he has sought very
few orders and that the other prosecutors in New York City have
shown similar self-restraint is both unproved and unprovable. Mr.
Hogan claims to have averaged about seventy-five wiretap orders
per year since June of 1958 and about nineteen bugging orders annually.117 This may be a lot or a little-it depends on how many
telephones, places, and people were involved. But this is only one
small part of the picture. There are many other police and prosecutorial agencies in New York City and State who can eavesdrop.
As to these, the Standards say only: "What has been true of the
Office of the District Attorney of New York has also been largely
true of the other agencies serving the cities" 118-but no figures are
presented.
Unfortunately-at least for the residents of New York City-the
ABA's implication of limited eavesdropping is simply not true.
From 1952 to 1954, for example, the New York City police alone
tapped some 2,625 telephones, 119 many of which were public facilities.120 This was at a time when they were averaging about 300 court
orders for wiretapping per year. 121 They were up to 451 court orders
in 1963 and 671 in 1964,122 and though the figures for the number
of telephones tapped in these years are not given, it cannot be small.
114. Hofmann, Police Said To Tap Police in Detroit, N.Y. Times, Feb. 6, 1967, at
18, col. I.
115. 1967 Senate Crime Hearings 1097.
116. ADA STANDAI!.DS 84; PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THE
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 202 (1967).
117. ABA STANDARDS 47, quoting PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 116, at 95.
118. Id.
119. Note, Wiretapping-Analysis of the Law and Practice Under New York Constitutional and Statutory Provisions, 31 N.Y.U. L. R.Ev. 197, 210 (1956).
120. Id. at 210 n.96.
121. See Hearings on the Current Wiretapping Dilemma in New York State
Created by Federal Court Decisions Before the N.Y. Commn. of l7!vestigation 129
(290 average from 1952-59); 1955 House Hearings (338 in 1952) (testimony of Edward
Silver).
122. See Statement of John F. Shanley, Supervising Assistant Chief Inspector, N.Y.
Police Department, before Illinois Crime Comm., Feb. 5, 1965, at 2 (mimeo).
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Finally, a state legislative committee recently reported that it knew
of some 22,000 wiretaps in New York State over a period of twelve
years.123 Since so many of these taps were made on public telephones,124 the privacy of thousands of innocent people was invaded
daily. This hardly seems like sparing use for "only ... important"
investigations.125
Reliable information on these surreptitious activities is not
readily available. New York Judge Nathan Sobel has gone so far
as to say: "No one, not the county prosecutor, nor the police, can
furnish valid statistics as to the number of court orders issued. None
are kept in the records of the court, prosecutor's office, or by the
police." 126 However, the recent and earlier revelations, which inevitably understate the picture, show indisputably that even without
the legitimation provided by title III, law enforcement officials were
eavesdropping intensively while flatly denying it in public. 127 Is it
likely that making these practices respectable will reduce the amount
of eavesdropping? Is it not far more probable that if the legislation
imposes any restraints, they will be as much ignored as the limitations imposed by prior law? Such lawlessness is indeed inevitable
since, as noted above, title III purports to legitimate only "tactical"
eavesdropping undertaken for the purpose of obtaining evidence of
a particular crime, not the kind of "strategic" surveillance that is
allegedly needed for investigating organized crime. The only effect
of title III may well be that from now on many who rarely or never
eavesdropped will be able to possess the equipment openly and have
it temptingly available for frequent use.
B. The Impact of Title III on the Amount of Eavesdropping

The openhandedness of title III is such that eavesdropping without its blessings will rarely be necessary. The combination of a
shopping list of eavesdroppable offenses, a less-than-airtight court
order system, generous "emergency" powers, broad "national security" provisions, and a somewhat ambiguous provision permitting
electronic surveillance for offenses "about to be" committed ensures
that an alert investigator will always be able to tune in legally, at
least for a limited period of time.
123. REPORT OF LEGISLATIVE RECOMMENDATIONS BY N.Y. STATE JOINT LEGISLATIVE
COM!\UTTEE ON CRIME, !'rs CAUSES, CONTROL AND EFFECT ON SOCIETY 15 (1967).
124. See PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 130 (public phones "a common target'); Note,
supra note 119, at 210 n.96.
125. ABA STANDARDS 46.
126. Letter to Senator Edward V. Long, April 19, 1967, reprinted in 1967 Long
Committee Hearings 642.
127. See note 109 supra.
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I. The Ofjenses for Which Eavesdropping Is Specifically
Permitted
As noted above, the current attempt to justify eavesdropping is
based almost exclusively on its indispensability as a tool for fighting
organized crime. The legislation, however, is not so restricted. When
an attempt was made in Congress to impose such a limit, Senators
McClellan and Tydings, floor managers for the Crime Control Act,
protested on the ground that they could not say what organized
crime was. 128 Senator McClellan also stressed that he wanted to
allow eavesdropping on black militants like Rap Brown and Stokely
Carmichael,129 and the statute therefore allows eavesdropping on
those suspected of being involved in civil disorders.130
Perhaps because organized crime can engage in a wide variety
of activities, title III allows eavesdropping for a vast number of
offenses, many of which will not be associated with organized crime
in most actual instances. For example, section 2516 allows federal
officials to tap and bug not only for such common activities of
organized crime as extortion, corruption, interstate gambling, loan
sharking, labor racketeering, and the like, but also for any offense
involving marijuana, riots, obstruction of a criminal investigation,
counterfeiting, and theft from interstate shipments.131
State officers are treated even more generously, despite the fact
that the states have a far smaller role than the federal government
in fighting organized crime. Indeed, one of the greatest problems in
fighting organized crime is that, for reasons to be explored more
fully below, few state or local law enforcement agencies show any
128. E.g., Tydings: "I suspect it is very difficult to say what organized crime is.''
II4 CONG. REc. S6198 (daily ed. May 23, 1968); McClellan, id. at S6197-98.
129. Id. at S6197, S6199.
130. Act, § 2516(l)(a).
131. There is one rather curious omission. Despite the importance of monopoly and
other restraints of trade in the activities of organized crime [see Schelling, Economic
Analysis and Organized Crime, in TASK FORCE REPORT ON ORGANIZED CRIME II4 (1967)],
the antitrust laws are not included in the federal list. Is that because the sponsors of
the legislation are really not that concerned about such "respectable" crimes, despite
the enormously greater cost to the community from such activities as price-fixing and
boycotts? It should be noted that, as the author concluded from two years on the staff
of the Senate Antitrust and Monopoly Subcommittee, the enthusiasm of Senators McClellan, Eastland, Dirksen, and Ervin for vigorous law enforcement has not usually
extended to the antitrust laws.
On the other hand, inclusion in this list of 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (1964), which prohibits any travel in or use of interstate commerce to further activities related to
gambling, narcotics, prostitution, extortion, bribery, or arson, in violation of any
federal or state law, permits electronic eavesdropping by federal officers for a wide variety
of often minor state offenses which happen to involve activities which cross a state line. I
am indebted to Micliael Tigar for bringing this to my attention.
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interest in the enterprise.132 Yet, states are given authority to use
electronic surveillance for offenses that are even further beyond the
normal reaches of organized crime than those enumerated above.
In fact, the list of offenses for which state eavesdropping is permitted
is practically unlimited: "murder, kidnapping, gambling, robbery,
bribery, extortion, or dealing in narcotic drugs, marihuana or other
dangerous drugs, or other crime dangerous to life, limb, or property,
and punishable by imprisonment for more than one year .. . or any
conspiracy to commit any of the foregoing offenses." 133 Since the
legislative history indicates that a crime "dangerous to ... property"
can include attempts to evade the payment of taxes,134 it is clear that
any kind of pecuniary harm is covered by the statute, and that state
officials can eavesdrop when investigating such offenses as state income tax evasion, prize fighting in Connecticut, the theft of a horse
or a chicken in other states,135 or smoking marijuana. Yet even with
respect to certain serious offenses, the case for eavesdropping authority is feeble, for the technique is of little use in solving murder cases
and of almost no use in investigating robbery, rape, or any other
crimes of violence that usually involved sudden, nonrepetitive encounters.136 Thus, far from limiting electronic eavesdropping to the
"important investigation" or "a limited class of designated violations,"137 title III grants authority to use eavesdropping almost as
freely as any other standard investigative tool. In this respect, it is
not very different from the New York statute which allows eavesdropping for any crime,138 and under which some eighty per cent
of police wiretapping was for the investigation of minor gambling
and vice offenses.139
132. See text accompanying notes 271-74.
133. Act § 2516(2) (emphasis added).
134. S. REP. No. 1097 at 99.
135. S. REP. No. 1097 at 99. See CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 53-200 (1958), as amended
(Supp., 1965); 11 DEL. CODE ANN. § 332 (1953); KY. REV. STAT. § 433.250 (1962); R.I.
GEN. LAWS ANN. § 11-8-6 (1956).
136. See Letter, supra note 126, in 1967 Long Committee Hearings 643.
137. ABA STANDARDS 46, § 5.6 (comment a).
138. [1968] Sess. Laws of N.Y. ch. 546, § 816, which replaced a similar earlier act,
[1958] Sess. Laws of N.Y. ch. 676, § 813-a.
139. For a discussion of New York police wiretapping, see PRIVACY AND FREEDOM
128.
A survey of the cases in the New York law reports prepared for the author by
Gerald Kahn, Michigan Law School '69, confirms that eavesdropping is used widely for
minor offenses and that organized-crime investigations account for a very small part
indeed. Although hardly a scientific sample, the results of the survey are consistent with
the findings of others.
Title III is likely to encourage the extension of eavesdropping to states which have
not used this technique before and have no real organized-crime problem. Police
spokesmen from Pennsylvania, Florida, and Connecticut have made it clear that they
would seek such authority from their states once federal enabling legislation is en•
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2. Judicial Supervision

The task of protecting privacy against whatever eavesdropping
remains illegal rests primarily with the judiciary. Unfortunately,
the experience with the few court order systems in effect prior to
the enactment of the Crime Control Act has been "very bad" 140
according to Samuel Dash, who has made perhaps the most thorough
study of this aspect of the problem; neither title III nor the ABA
Standards will do much to improve things. In the past, supporting
affidavits have often been skimpy141 and even false. 142 Although the
Standards claim that these problems have been solved by cases like
Mapp v. Ohio 143 and People v. McCall, 144 some of the inadequate
affidavits are post-Mapp and it is still too early to determine what
effect McCall will have.145
Moreover, even with more restrictive judicial supervision, some
judges are not too demanding. For example, Congressman Emanuel
Celler reported that he knew of one judge who used to sign hundreds
of orders "without putting in any name and the [police] sergeant
filled the names in. He could go down to the clerk and get any
authorization he wanted." 146 Some judges have publicly stated that
they never refuse certain kinds of warrants.147 It is therefore hardly
acted. Given today's climate and the respectability granted the practice by federal
authorization, such legislation is likely to be passed, and perhaps not inappropriately.
These are states which may well have some organized crime, although their inability
to cope adequately with it until now is not really attributable to the lack of wiretapping authority. See text accompanying notes 263-74 infra. But we may also see
enactment of such a statute in a state like Iowa. In 1962, an Iowa district attorney
testified that despite the absence of any organized crime problem in his state, wiretapping "would be a valuable tool in Iowa to help us in solving the crimes that we
have." Hearings on S. 2813 and S. 1195 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 87th
Cong., 2d Sess. 264 (1962).
140. 1961 Senate Hearings 104-05 (testimony of Samuel Dash).
141. In re Interception of Telephone Communication, 207 Misc. 69, 136 N.Y.S.2d
612, 613 (Sup. Ct. 1955).
142. Report of the King's County Grand Jury summarized in Westin, The WireTapping Problem: An Analysis and a Legislative Proposal, 52 CoLUM. L. REv. 165,
195-96 (1952); see also 1955 House Hearings 217-18 (testimony of William Keating).
The lengthy affidavit reprinted in ABA STANDARDS 191-94 as a "representative" affidavit
seems anything but that, to judge from the affidavits in such cases as Berger, Katz,
and others; see, e.g., People v. Gold, 46 Misc. 2d 860, 259 N.Y.S.2d 867 (1965); People
v. Rogers, 46 Misc. 2d 860, 261 N.Y .S.2d 152 (1965).
143. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
144. 17 N.Y.2d 152, 216 N.E.2d 570, 269 N.Y.S.2d 396 (1966).
145. McCall held that eavesdropping orders were subject to a full hearing on
legality, similar to other search warrants.
146. Hearings Before Subcomm. No. 5 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th
Cong., 1st Sess. 407 (1967).
147. New York Hearings, supra note 121, at 159 (testimony of former N.Y. S. Ct.
Justice Ferdinand Pecora). The author heard one New York judge declare in an
unguarded moment at a small but public bar association meeting in 1964 that, "I
sign every wiretap order that's put in front of me."
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surprising that few prosecutors have complained about the difficulty
in obtaining orders.148 Despite the obvious dangers that officials will
go "judge-shopping," neither title III nor the Standards attempt to
incorporate any of the safeguards against such a practice that have
been proposed elsewhere; 140 both provisions allow application to
any judge of competent jurisdiction.150
The normal dangers of any ex parte application are somewhat
reduced by an after-the-fact hearing if anything is seized or attempted
to be used. For this procedure to be an effective safeguard, obviously there must be notice of the seizure; generally this is automatically provided with the conventional search, but not with a
surreptitious eavesdrop. Of course, there must also be a right and an
opportunity to object. As to notice, title III offers relatively little.
Sections 2518(8) and (9) provide that notice must be given only to
the persons named in the application; it requires an affirmative
exercise of discretion by the judge to give notice to others, and this
in a setting where, by hypothesis, those others are not present to
argue their case for notice. Thus, even parties to an intercepted conversation depend upon the discretion of the court if they are not
named in the application, and on only partially informed discretion
at that. Additionally, on an ex parte application, giving notice may
be postponed, apparently indefinitely.151 If the content of that interception, or evidence derived from it, is offered in evidence, all
parties to the proceeding must be given notice, but only an "aggrieved person"-defined as "a party to the intercepted communication . . . or party against whom the interception was directed"148. "It is practically unheard of for a judge to fail to grant a wiretap order for
the district attorney." s. DASH, R. KNOWLTON, & R. SCHWARTZ, THE EAVESDROPPERS 45
(1959). See also Hearings on H.R. 408 Before Subcomm. No. 3 of the House Comm. on
the Judiciary, 83d Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 7, at 37 (1953) (testimony of former U.S. Attorney
General, now Secretary of State William P. Rogers: "I don't recall any difficulty in getting
permission of the court •••• it's pretty easy."); N. SOBEL, CURRENT PROBLEMS IN THE LAW
OF SEARCH AND SEIZURE 111 (1964).
Lest such successes be considered a thing of the past, see Neyer, Book Review, 15
CIVIL LIBERTIES IN NEW YoRK 8 (1967), indicating that when challenged, New York City
Police Department and Brooklyn and Westchester D.A.'s representatives were unable to
present a single instance in which they had been turned down.
149. New York State Constitutional Convention, Text, Abstract and Highlights of
Proposed Constitution of the State of New York, art. I, § 4 (1967). (When submitted
to the electorate, the proposed constitution was defeated by a margin of nearly 3 to 1
-Schanberg, Rockefeller Will Try To Salvage Sections of Beaten Proposal, N.Y.
Times, Nov. 8, 1967, at 1, col. 8). See also Assn., of the Bar of the City of New York Committees on Federal Legislation and Civil Rights of the Association of the Bar of the
City of New York, Proposed Legislation on Eavesdropping After Berger v. New York
and Katz v. United States, 7 N.Y.C.B.A. Co11m. RPTs. BULL. 2, at 1 (1968). For proof
of the practice, see Letter, supra note 126, in 1967 Long Commitee Hearings 643.
150. Act § 2518(1); ABA STANDARDS § 5.1.
151. Act § 2518(8)(d).
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may object.1152 The Act and Standards thus seem to mcorporate the
existing restrictions on standing153 which are currently being reconsidered by the Supreme Court.1154 Under these limitations, strongly
supported by the ABA, 155 nonparties to an illegally intercepted
conversation will rarely be able to object, no matter how much they
are affected by the interception. Therefore, in the not uncommon
situation where the interception is used to persuade the party
overheard to inform on a third person, the third party would not
be entitled to challenge.156 This inhibition on third-party challenges
is particularly troublesome in the eavesdropping area, since the use
of seized communications is often quite indirect. 157
Moreover, title III makes no attempt to ensure disclosure of the
existence of eavesdropping. Forcing such disclosure can be extremely
difficult, as the recent Long Committee hearings have made clear.
Some added protection might result from requiring the prosecutor,
on demand, to make a full investigation of all officers who have
worked on a case, and on that basis to state, under oath, whether
eavesdropping has been used at any time. Othenvise, the defense may
find it impossible to meet the Nardone 158 burden of introducing
some evidence of eavesdropping in order to put the matter in issue.
Even this device is likely to be relatively feeble, for, in the last analysis, "barring accidental discovery, all disclosure of such surveillance
152. Act§§ 2518(10), 2510(11); S. REP. No. 1097, at 91, 106.
153. For the existing law, see Berger; Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960);
Goldstein v. United States, 316 U.S. 114 (1942). The standing requirement has been
abolished in California. People v. Martin, 45 Cal. 2d 755,290 P.2d 855 (1955).
154. Kolod v. United States, 371 F.2d 983, cert. denied, 390 U.S. 136, petition for
rehearing granted and order denying petition for writ of certiorari set aside, 392 U.S.
919 (1968). The Solicitor General opposes liberalization of the standing requirements on
the ground that this would entitle every criminal defendant to "examine the records of
every conversation ever overheard by the government, on the theory that the overhearing
of any conversation might have produced investigative leads which eventually led to
evidence that was used against him." Brief for the United States at 24. This burden can
apparently be met sometimes. See United States v. Zirpolo, 288 F. Supp. 993 (D.N.J. 1968).
155. The Standards justify the current standing rule with the comment that it "provides a convenient ••. line between 'enough' and 'too much' deterrence." ABA STANDARDS
117. Can there be "too much" deterrence of illegal conduct? If the community may
prosecute such illegality in the name of deterrence, a remedy provided by title III but
usually futile, why may not the injured party more effectively seek to deter it by preventing his prosecution? Or is the demand for "law and order" inapplicable to the
forces of "justice"?
156. See, e.g., Goldstein v. United States, 316 U.S. 114 (1942).
157. Eavesdropping evidence is actually used primarily for leads and intelligence,
and is introduced in court rather infrequently because of the difficulties in transcription; see 1955 House Hearings 331 (testimony of Frank Hogan). There is, of course, a
great danger that what will be introduced will often be the eavesdroppers' recreated
version of what was overheard. This seems to have happened in the Berger case
itself. Grutzner, Berger Attacks Recorded Talks, N.Y. Times, Oct. 28, 1964, at 46, col. I.
158. Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939).
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ultimately depends upon the good faith of those who have the power
and mechanical ability to utilize this technique." 169 As we now know,
skillful prosecutors have been able to avoid disclosing the existence
of wiretapping, and even to avoid learning about it themselves. And
even where the defendant can overcome these obstacles and make an
attack, the recent dilution of the standards for probable cause in
Peters v. New York 160 means that there is little chance of a successful challenge unless the lower courts agree that more stringent
standards are necessary in eavesdropping cases-a probably futile
hope.
Finally, the requirement set forth in section 2518(l)(c), that reasons must be given as to why measures other than eavesdropping are
not used, is likely to be of little or no significance if any relationship
to organized crime is alleged; and this seems to be the only requirement specially imposed for wiretapping and bugging.
In sum, title Ill's court order provision offers relatively little
protection on its face, and merely adopts the conventional court
order system with all its shortcomings. For this reason, it may seem
that at least some of the foregoing criticisms apply not so much to
title III in particular but rather to judicial supervision in any context. To some degree this is true, for there is much discontent with
judicial supervision of invasions of privacy.161 Given such weaknesses in the over-all system, however, it becomes all the more important to introduce as many meaningful safeguards as possible, and,
if none of these is really effective, to ask whether eavesdropping
authority should be given at all.
C. Emergency Authority
Even the feeble safeguards of title III seem to be too severe for
its authors and the ABA Advisory Committee, for under both the
Act and the Standards, police can either forestall judicial supervision until something good turns up or avoid it entirely. One of
the means of avoidance is provided by the "emergency" provision
159. United States v. Zirpolo, 288 F. Supp. 993 (D.N.J. 1968). For a discussion of how
prosecutors have been able to avoid disclosure of electronic eavesdropping by simple
denial that their evidence was derived through such techniques, see Note, Exclusion of
Evidence Obtained by Wire Tapping: An Illusory Safeguard, 61 YALE L.J. 1221 (1952).
Such tactics are no longer quite so effective since the Supreme Court has decided that
decisions on exclusion may not be made solely on the basis of the prosecutor's representation. Kolod v. United States, 390 U.S. 136 (1968).
160. 389 U.S. 950 (1968). But see Spinelli v. United States, 4 CR. L. REP. 3083 Gan.
27, 1969).
161. See Report on Criminal Courts Committee, Bronx County Bar Association,
reported in N.Y. Times, March 10, 1965, at 51 (warrants frequently granted on false
affidavits); H. Schwartz, Stop and Frisk, 58 J. CRIM. L.C. 8e P.S. 433, 450-51 (1967).
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of the Act, section 2518(7), which allows police to eavesdrop for up
to forty-eight hours without prior judicial approval if "an emergency
situation exists with respect to conspiratorial activities threatening
the national security interest or to conspiratorial activities characteristic of organized crime," and if there are grounds upon which
an order could be based. It is obviously possible to use a plea of emergency as justification for some fishing on the basis of hunches; 162
this has often occurred in the past, 163 and the police apparently want
to continue doing so regularly. If nothing turns up, nothing is lost,
for who will ever find out? If something does turn up within fortyeight hours, the police can then apply to a judge for retroactive ratification. And, as the Supreme Court has recognized, at such a
point the pressure on the judge to ratify a successful investigation
in order to permit use of relevant evidence is very strong indeed, 164
especially if the particular magistrate, like so many judges, is not
altogether happy with the exclusionary rule when it prohibits the
use of important evidence. Experience also indicates that an officer
seeking to validate his original intrusion will rarely hesitate to embroider the past a bit in order to make it easier for the judge to find
the probable cause ab initio. 165
Both the wisdom and the constitutionality of this emergency
power are dubious. 166 No criteria for determining what will be considered an "emergency" are indicated in the statute.167 Indeed, only
one example is given in the legislative history: a meeting of suspected
criminals is arranged and then held almost immediately thereafter,
leaving no time for the police to obtain an order. 168
What justification is there for always allowing such a lengthy
postponement169 of resort to a magistrate in such a situation? Surely
162. J. SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WITHOUT TRIAL 216 (1966): PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 128.
163. In one case, police bugged a series of conversations for a week, picking up
apparently quite intimate conversations, and then dropped the matter when they
found nothing criminal. PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 124-25.
164. Cf. Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 96 (1964) ("the far less reliable procedure of an
after-the-event justification for the ••• search, [is] too likely to be subtly influenced
by the familiar shortcomings of hindsight judgment'').
165. J. SKOLNICK, supra note 162, at 144; L. TIFFANY, D. McINTYRE, 8: D. ROTEN·
DERG, DETECTION OF CRIME 128 (1967).
166. Significantly, this was the provision which came closest to defeat, prevailing
in the Senate by only a seven-vote margin: 44-37. 114 CONG. REc. S6193 (daily ed. May
23, 1968).
167. Cf. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298-99 (1967) ("hot pursuit" exception).
168. S. REP. No. 1097, at 104; ABA STANDARDS 13.
169. It may be more than forty-eight hours: the officers need apply to a magistrate
"within 48 hours after the interception has occurred, or begins to occur,'' with no provision for "whichever is earlier," as appears in the very next sentence. Act § 2518(7).
Where the interception, that is, the "aural acquisition of ••• any wire or oral com-
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sometime during the forty-eight hours the eavesdropping officers
can-and probably must-notify someone at their headquarters of
their activities and the reason for the eavesdrop, and certainly that
person could arrange for the application. In another context we are
told by District Attorney Hogan and the ABA Advisory Committee
that it requires four to six men to set up an interception, and much
time and effort.170 If so, at least one of this large group should be
able to arrange for someone to get to a magistrate in less than fortyeight hours, especially since few meetings are likely to last for nvo
full days without interruption. Nor does it normally take fortyeight hours to find a judge. Even Senator Tydings claimed that it
takes only "twelve to fourteen hours sometimes,"171 and, in large
cities where most organized crime conspiracies are encountered,
one can usually find a magistrate quite quickly.172 With the possible
exception of time periods beginning on Friday nights, it will almost
never require two days to find a sitting-much less a sleepingmagistrate.
It is also hard to believe that emergencies of the kind described
are so frequent and important that, despite the obvious potential
for abuse, a special broad exemption must be created for them.
Judge and former district attorney Edward S. Silver has commented
on this point: "The need for an order doesn't suddenly pop up. A
situation develops over a long period of time, at least a considerable
number of days. Thus the law-enforcing agent has plenty of time
to get the order if he has the legal grounds upon which to get it."173
The constitutional authority for such emergency powers is as
dubious as the wisdom of granting them. In Katz, the Court expressly
rejected the Government's request for a similar exemption from observance of the warrant requirement, saying that "the use of electronic surveillance without prior. authorization [could not] be justified on the ground of 'hot pursuit.' " 174 The Court then cited Warden
v. Hayden 115 with the comment that "[a]lthough 'the Fourth Amendment does not require police to delay ... if to do so would gravely
munication," takes several hours or days, the 48 hours may run from its termination.
Act § 2510(4).
170. 1961 Hearings 1094; ABA STANDARDS 45.
171. 114 CoNG. REc. S6192 (daily ed. May 23, 1968).
172. Even so experienced an eavesdropper as former Brooklyn District Attorney
Edward S. Silver conceded this point at one time. 1955 House Hearings 98 ("He can

get an order pretty quickly if he has the grounds to get it.').
173. Id.
174. 389 U.S. at 357-58.
175. 389 U.S. 294 (1967).
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endanger their lives or the lives of others,' Warden v. Hayden ...
there seems little likelihood that electronic surveillance would be
a realistic possibility in a situation so fraught with urgency." 176 The
obvious implication from Katz, and of course from Warden itself,
is that the only emergency justifying a dispensation from antecedent
judicial approval is one posing a danger to life-not merely a loss
of evidence.
On the other hand, Carroll v. United States177 and Schmerber v.
California178 do support some relaxation of the warrant requirements
for a wider range of emergencies, for in both cases a warrant was
dispensed with in connection with a search for nonlethal evidence
and in neither was there any danger to life. Although for some reason
the Government did not invoke these cases for this point in Katz, 179
the Senate Committee Report and Standards rely heavily on them,
with the Report completely ignoring Katz; in addition, the Standards
cite present New York law as a precedent.180
Although the Carroll and Schmerber cases do offer some support
for emergency powers, they are readily distinguishable on several
significant grounds. In the first place, in neither case was there really
any time at all, much less forty-eight hours, in which to obtain a
magistrate's approval. In Carroll, it was possible that only a matter
of minutes would elapse between the moment when the officers
spotted Carroll's car and the time when he might have eluded them
permanently. Similarly, the police in Schmerber probably had at
best only a few hours in which to obtain a valid blood sample before
the alcohol content of the suspect's bloodstream diminished, and,
since Schmerber was arrested in the very early hours of the morning, this could well have happened before a magistrate became
available.181 Second, Carroll involved a situation in which contraband might have been permanently lost if it was not seized immediately, and the state's independent interest in preventing continued
circulation of such contraband was at stake-usually a more significant interest than the mere collection of evidence. Schmerber,
176. 389 U.S. at 358 n.21.
177. 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
178. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
179. See Brief for Respondent United States, in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347
(1967). Carroll was cited for a related point on constitutionally protected areas. Id.
at 17, 18.
180. S. REP. No. 1097, at 104; ABA STANDARDS 134, citing former N.Y. Code Crim.
Proc. § 813(b).
181. 384 U.S. at 758 n.2. See also 384 U.S. at 770-71: "[W)here time had to be taken
to bring the accused to a hospital and to investigate the scene of the accident, there
was no time to seek out a magistrate and secure a warrant."
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while involving mere evidence and not contraband, dealt with a
situation where the most significant kind of evidence-and perhaps
the only kind-would be irretrievably lost during the time it took
to secure the approval of a magistrate.
Finally, the reliance on New York precedent by the ABA commentary is also somewhat dubious: although prior New York law
did contain an emergency provision, the New York legislation
enacted after the Katz decision omitted such a section.182

D. National Security
The second specific means by which law enforcement officials
can avoid direct judicial supervision is by invoking title Ill's "national security" exemption. Relaxation of the limits on electronic
eavesdropping on these grounds has long bedevilled civil libertarians.
They have claimed, with some justification, that such an exception
really has little value, that the power has been abused,183 and that
the constitutional arguments apply here in the same way that they
do in other eavesdropping situations. Nevertheless, there has never
been much hope that such practices could be stopped, since they are
performed in secret and rarely come to light thereafter. Few political figures are willing to speak out against such an exemption,
partly because there is an inevitable and apparently unshakable
feeling that where "national security" is concerned, the practice must
be of some value.184 The world of intelligence and counterintelligence is regarded as "dirty business" anyway, and electronic eavesdropping seems an inevitable part of this way of life whether or not
its value can be proved.
For practical purposes, the controversy over the national security
exemption has centered on whether this type of eavesdropping
should be subjected to judicial control. The Supreme Court has not
yet had to meet this issue,185 although a facet of the problem is cur182. Compare [1968] N.Y. Sess. Laws ch. 546 with former N.Y. CODE CRIM. PROC.
813-b; State of New York Temporary Commn. on Revision of the Penal Law and
Criminal Code, Proposed Crim. Proc. L. § 370.20 (1967). Recent New Jersey legislation,
patterned after title III, requires at least verbal judicial approval. 4 CR. L. REP. 2346
aan. 14, 1969).
183. For a listing of some of the abuses which includes the destruction of tapes
by the FBI and the bugging of John L. Lewis, Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt, and various
government officials, see, e.g., Theoharis &: Meyer, The "National Security" Justification
for Electronic Eavesdropping: An Elusive Exception, 14 WAYNE L. REv. 749, 760-62
(1968).
184. This may be at least part of the reason for former Attorney General Ramsey
Clark's support for electronic surveillance in national security cases, despite his skep·
ticism as to its value generally. For criticism of this alleged inconsistency, see Ruth,
Why Organized Crime Thrives, 374 ANNALS 113, 116 n.4 (1967).
185. See Katt v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 358 n.23 Gustice Stewart for the ma•
jority), 363-64 Gustice White, concurring), 359-60 Gustice Douglas, concurring).
§
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rently before the Court, 186 and until the passage of the Crime Control
Act it seemed as if the general eavesdropping impasse would leave
this question unresolved also.187 Section 2511(3) of the Act now legitimates the President's power to order eavesdropping for purposes of
intelligence and counterintelligence against foreign powers without
antecedent judicial approval. The provision, however, goes beyond
this customary formulation of the national security exemption: it
extends the exception to "any other clear and present danger to the
structure and existence of the government," language so broad that
it might be construed to embrace even a movement to alter the
electoral college, or more pertinently, any black militant or radical
group such as the Black Panther Party, the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), the "Yippies," or any other "subversive" organization even though it has no credible links to a foreign power. It
has recently been revealed that President Franklin D. Roosevelt,
who first authorized such eavesdropping, intended the power to be
exercised very sparingly and only on aliens, 188 but the power was
expanded during both World War II and the early days of the Cold
War. 189 There is no reason to think that the amount of electronic
surveillance for this purpose has since diminished in any respect. 190
The Crime Control Act thus merely continues this tendency to
sweep dissent and difference under the heading of "national security."
When objections to the broad sweep of the national security exemption were raised in Congress, Senator McClellan declared that
the provision would not give the President any more powers than
those he already has under the Constitution.191 This is not altogether
clear, however. When the national security section is read in light
of its legislative history, it expresses a clear intent to allow eavesdropping on such activities without any judicial supervision, a great
and almost unique departure from normal fourth amendment requirements. The Senate Committee Report stresses that even where
such intrusions eventually come before a judge because an attempt
186. Ivanov v. United States, 384 F.2d 554 (1967), cert. granted, 392 U.S. 923 (1968).
The primary issue in the case relates to the degree to which eavesdropping logs and
notes must be disclosed to the defense for purposes of determining taint, where the
existence of such eavesdropping comes to light. The Government is seeking to restrict
this to what a judge, after an in camera examination, deems relevant; cf. 18 U.S.C.
§ 3500 Gencks statute related to impeachment).
187. Some observers believed that this issue was the primary cause of the impasse.
188. Theoharis & Meyer, supra note 183, at 768 n.100.
189. Id. at 760-61.
190. Indeed, Professor Westin has concluded that there is now probably more
eavesdropping than ever before. PRIVACY AND FREEDOM: 119.
191. 114 CoNc. REc. S6245 (daily ed. May 23, 1968).
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is made to use the fruits in evidence-and this will be a relatively
rare occurrence192-admissibility will turn on reasonableness only,
with the possibility of prior judicial authorization but one factor
to be considered in the determination. The Senate Report states:
"No preference should be given to either alternative [that is, whether
a warrant was or was not obtained], since this would tend to limit
the very power that this provision recognizes is not to be deemed
disturbed." 193
The constitutionality of this latter construction is dubious. So
far, no general exception to the warrant requirement has been recognized for national security cases,194 let alone an exception for so vague
and overbroad a class of activities as those which might pose a
"danger to the structure ... of the government." Recently, in United
States v. Robel,195 the Court stressed that the talismanic phrase "national defense" cannot be used to override those rights and values
which the national defense is supposed to safeguard. In earlier congressional discussion, the Justice Department sought to avoid judicial supervision, allegedly because of fear of information leaks and
prejudicial delay.196 Leaks and delay were said to be unlikely, however, by Judge Edward Silver,197 who criticized such an exception to
antecedent judicial supervision despite his general desire to have
eavesdropping authority. Even if the case for such an exception were
stronger than it is, there is really no reason why these powers could
not be scrutinized by an appropriate committee of Congress. The
ABA Standards refer to the desirability of such supervision, but
they omit any detailed analysis.198
Because antecedent approval and virtually all post hoc supervision are abrogated for this potentially vast range of activity, it is
doubtful that the "probable cause" requirements can effectively limit
192. In Ivanov, the Solicitor General declared "[T]he government has not claimed
that evidence obtained by electronic eavesdropping in the course of a national security
investigation is admissible in a criminal trial." Brief for the United States at 8-9.
193. S. REP. No. 1097, at 94.
194. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 358 n.23. In Ivanov, the Solicitor General has asserted that "[i]t is at least arguable that, within this narrow area, the
Executive has independent constitutional authority .•• [because] the 'President • • •
possesses in his own right certain powers conferred by the Constitution on him as
Commander-in-Chief and as the Nation's organ in foreign affairs.' " (Brief for the
United States at 6), citing C. & S. Airlines, Inc. v. Waterman Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 109
(1948), which refused to review "Presidential discretion as to political matters" (333
U.S. at 114) involving grant of an international route to one airline.
195. 389 U.S. 258, 263-64 (1967).
196. Hearings on S. 2813 and S. 1495 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
87th Cong., 2d Sess. 16-17 (1962) (testimony of Robert Kennedy).
197. See, e.g., 1955 House Hearings 98.
198. ABA STANDARDS § 3.1-.2, comment a; cf. PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 391.
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eavesdropping that is allegedly related to the protection of national
security. There is no way to compel disclosure of the existence of
such eavesdropping in the first place, so that compliance with whatever "reasonableness" requirements are imposed can be verified.199
In the very few instances where such a disclosure does occur, the
Senate Report declares that the statute requires only an "ad hoc"
determination of reasonableness, "taking into consideration all of
the facts and circumstances of the individual case, which is but the
test of the Constitution itself." 20° Carroll v. United States, which the
Senate Report cites in support of this proposition, did insist on
probable cause; 201 but where national security is balanced against
the intrusion, the standards almost certainly will be relaxed, as
they have been elsewhere.202 The ABA Standards increase this possibility by invoking the much-criticized and heretofore unique "border
search" as a precedent.203
The national security provision is therefore likely to exempt
such eavesdropping from present constitutional limitations almost
completely. This seems to be the only fourth amendment area where
an outright exemption is made because of the type of offense under
investigation-except for the border search204-and it is yet another
instance in which Congress has required fewer protections limiting
eavesdropping, not more as Berger directed. Further, the breadth of
the exemption will permit much intrusion on private speech and
association, thereby raising serious first amendment issues.205 Since
this power probably will be used almost exclusively for intelligence
and rarely for evidentiary purposes, challenge and control of even
the mildest variety will be virtually impossible.206
199. Former Attorney General Ramsey Clark voluntarily disclosed the existence of
electronic eavesdropping in such cases as Ivanov, Clay, and many others, but these are
cases in litigation, and the demands of fairness mandate such disclosure. Moreover, even
in such instances, experience in Coplon and other cases indicates that disclosure will
rarely be made voluntarily. See Report on Certain Alleged Practices of the F.BJ., IO
LAW. Gun.D R.Ev. 185 (1950), for examples of very wide-ranging eavesdropping in national security cases which would ordinarily not be disclosed.
200. S. REP. No. 1097, at 94.
201. 267 U.S. 132, 155-56 (1925).
202. Cf. Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959), for a discussion of balancing where national security is concerned.
203. ABA STANDARDS § 3.2, comment b. For the criticism, see Note, Search and
Seizure at the Border-The Border Search, 21 RUTGERS L. R.Ev. 513 (1967); Comment,
Intrusive Border Searches-Is Judicial Control Desirable?, II5 U. PA. L. R.Ev. 276
(1966); Comment, Border Searches and the Fourth Amendment, 77 YALE L.J. 1007
(1967). The Standards omit any reference to this criticism.
204. Cf. Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217 (1960), in which the FBI had to resort
to an Immigration Naturalization Service arrest because it lacked probable cause.
205. This of course distinguishes it from the usual border search which raises no
such issues.
206. In this connection, the Standards almost indignantly reject any attempt to
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E. Some Problems of Scope
Title III and the Standards at least purport to subject emergency
eavesdropping to ostensibly significant controls, and to place national
security eavesdropping under some restrictions. With respect to two
kinds of eavesdropping, however, the legislation and the ABA proposal do not even atempt to impose limits; those interceptions that
take place with the consent of one of the parties and those which
occur by means of an extension telephone. Some brief comments are
in order for each of these problems.

I. Extension Telephones
Under the definition of "device" given in section 2510(5), an extension telephone is excluded from the Act's prohibitions. There
is no authority for such an exception, nor is any explanation given
for it in the legislative history of title III. The only possible support
for this exclusion is Rathbun v. United States, 201 but that case turned
on a statutory definition of "intercept," 208 and, more fundamentally,
it involved consent by one of the parties to the conversation.
deny the government the right to use such evidence in court on the ground that this
would produce secret eavesdropping and a Kafkaesque world. ABA STANDARDS 122•24.
But this comment almost seems tongue in cheek, for it is clear that the power to keep
the eavesdropping secret still remains with the government, and the Standards make no
effort to change this. Moreover, denial of admissibility in an attempt (probably futile) to
discourage excessive eavesdropping by making it less profitable does not imply nondisclosure-a defendant could still be allowed to find out whether any of the fruits
of eavesdropping were used as leads, even if not as evidence. Joseph K's problem was
not that his accusers couldn't use any of their evidence against him but that he
couldn't find out what the charges and evidence were.
An additional opportunity for extensive wiretapping appears in the probable
cause section: an order can be issued to obtain facts concerning a crime "about to be
committed." § 2518(l)(b), (3). No Supreme Court case has approved or even dealt with
such an anticipatory search. Berger is cited by the Senate Committee Report, but
Berger, citing the classic statements in Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160
(1949) and Carroll, refers solely to searches for crimes which have been or are being
committed. 388 U.S. at 55, 56, 58. The only Supreme Court reference to such a concept appears in Justice Douglas' dissent in Terry v. Ohio, where he describes the
occasions for a search. 392 U.S. I, 35 (1968).
A search for evidence of a crime "about to committed" throws the possibility of
surveillance even farther back in time than the present broad scope of such inchoate
crimes as attempt, conspiracy, and solicitation allow. It is too early to tell whether
this is wise, but it is certainly both novel and troublesome. The Justice Department
disapproved this provision on the ground that it was vague and likely to be abused.
114 CoNG. REc. S6108-11 (daily ed. May 22, 1968). Its vagueness was demonstrated
during the Senate debate. When Senators Tydings and McClellan were challenged to
cite cases of a crime "about to be committed" which did not really amount to a
crime already or then being committed, they were unable to do so. 114 CoNG. REc.
S6110 (daily ed. May 22, 1968). Senator McClellan fell back on Katz, where the police
had evidence that the defendant was engaged in illegal activity before they installed
the tap; Senator Tydings provided a case which involved an existing as well as a future
violation.
207. 355 U.S. 107 (1957).
208. See United States v. Jones 292 F. Supp. 1001 (D.D.C. 1968).
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There are many situations in which undesirable eavesdropping
may be accomplished by using an extension telephone. Indeed, the
exemption is broader than the traditional home telephone that comes
to mind when we think of an extension. It includes all equipment
"furnished to the subscriber or user by a communications common
carrier in the ordinary course of its business and being used by the
subscriber or user in the ordinary course of its business."209 This
definition can encompass a switchboard in a huge corporation, law
firm, or hotel to which police gain access with or without the permission of the subscriber.210 Surely invasions of privacy of this magnitude are too serious to be excluded from control. Perhaps the
law should not try to regulate eavesdropping by one family member
upon another over an extension telephone, but the present exemption in this area is far too broad to accomplish such a limited
objective.
2. Consent
Title III and the Standards also grant a blanket exclusion from
control for eavesdropping that is undertaken with the consent of
one party to the communication. This exception was easy to support
with decisions like On Lee v. United States211 and Lopez v. United
States 212-at least until Osborn213 and Katz were decided. The Court
originally granted certiorari in Osborn in order to consider the continuing vitality of Lopez;214 it chose, however, to affirm the conviction not on the basis of Lopez and its consent theory, but rather on
the ground of antecedent judicial approval. The Court's choice
of this ground for decision, plus the aforementioned approving references to that rationale in Berger and Katz, may indicate that Justice
Brennan's dissent in Lopez, 215 in which he concluded that surrepti209. Act § 2510(5)(a)(i).
210. The Long Committee Hearings brought out the existence of equipment
known as "service-observing equipment," leased by telephone companies to approximately 4,000 firms and individuals. With it, a president of a company can listen in
on all the phone conversations taking place and can, of course, permit others to do
so as well. 1967 Long Committee Hearings 395. Professor Westin has also pointed out
the great cooperation between hotel managers and the police. PRIVACY AND FREEDOM
120-21.
211. 343 U.S. 747 (1952).
212. 373 U.S. 427 (1963). In On Lee, a government informer was outfitted with a
radio transmitter, and sent into the suspect's laundry; their conversation was overheard and testified to by government agents. In Lopez, a government revenue agent,
whom the suspect tried to bribe, recorded his conversation with the suspect on a
miniature recorder, the tapes from which were introduced as evidence to corrobate
the agent's testimony.
213. Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 326 (1966).
214. 385 U.S. at 324-25.
215. 373 U.S. at 446.
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tious recording of a conversation by one of the parties thereto was an
unconstitutional invasion of privacy, will soon be accepted by a
majority of the Court. In addition, Justice Stewart's comment
that "what [a person] . . . seeks to preserve as private . . . may be
constitutionally protected"216 has led at least a few courts to conclude
that On Lee and its progeny are now dead. 217 Indeed, the Solicitor
General recently informed the Court, during oral argument of the
Ivanov case, that in his judgment governmental eavesdropping on a
conversation between nvo people may violate the fourth amendment
as interpreted in Katz even if one party consented to an interception.218
The consent problem is too difficult to explore in detail here; 219
but surely one cannot easily dismiss the threats to privacy posed by
consensual eavesdropping of the kind approved in On Lee. Indeed,
Professor Westin has concluded that this is perhaps the most widespread form of electronic surveillance being used today and that it
should not be left unregulated. 220 Under title III and the decisions
in On Lee and Hoffa v. United States, 221 however, there are virtually
no judicial controls on the use of electronic aids in schemes utilizing
informers to deceive suspects into making self-incriminatory statements; the only hope seems to be that the Osborn procedure may
eventually become mandatory.222
216. 389 U.S. at 351-52.
217. Compare White v. United States, 4 CR. L. REP 2317 (7th Cir. Jan. 9, 1969);
Doty v. United States, 3 CR. L. REP. 2220 (10th Cir. June 4, 1968); and United States v.
Jones, 292 F. Supp. 1001 (D.D.C. 1968); with United States v. Kaufer, 4 CR. L. REP.
2333 (2d Cir. Jan. 14, 1969), Dancy v. United States, 390 F.2d 370 (5th Cir. 1968) and
Handsford v. United States, 390 F.2d 373 (5th Cir. 1967) (On Lee still good law). The
issue has been ably presented to the Court in a petition for certiorari filed in Douglas
v. Massachusetts, petition for certiorari filed, 3 CR. L. REP. 2186 Gune 5, 1968).
218. Oral Argument by Solicitor General Griswold in Ivanov v. United States, No.
11 (U.S. 1968), at 27:
Q. Mr. Solicitor General, assume that A invites B and C to a meeting at his
house and A consents, asks the Government or consents to the taping of that
conversation by the Government. Now, the Government position is that B and C
-has there been any violation of the Fourth Amendment?
A. Mr. Justice, I think there may be under the Katz case.
Q. Even though A has consented?
A. Even though A has consented, just as though the telephone company consented in the Katz case, I don't think that would have made any difference.
219. See Greenawalt, The Consent Problem in Wiretapping and Eavesdropping;
Surreptitious Monitoring with the Consent of a Participant in a Conversation, 68
CoLUM:. L. REv. 189 (1968).
220. PRIVACY AND FREEDOM: 131 ("used tens of thousands of times each year"), 390
("Allowing eavesdropping with the consent of one party would destroy the statutory
plan of limiting the offenses for which eavesdropping by device can be used and
insisting on a court order process.").
221. 385 U.S. 293 (1966).
222. If it does not, we shall continue to be exposed to the kind of totally uncontrolled intrusion which Professor Leslie Fiedler and his family endured at the
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F. Other Sanctions: The Reporting System and Private Actions

Title III contains one provision which might induce some restraint with regard to the number of eavesdropping orders issued.
Section 2519 requires that state and federal judges must send full
reports of all orders applied for and issued to the Administrator of
the United States Courts. In addition, the principal prosecuting
officers of each state and the federal government must report to the
Administrator all arrests, trials, and convictions resulting from such
, orders. The Administrator must then transmit a summary of this
information to Congress in April of each year. I£ the figures are made
public-and the statute is silent on that point-widespread courtordered eavesdropping might produce an adverse public reaction.
This in tum could induce some reduction in the number of orders
granted. Of course, the importance of this provision depends on the
existence and amount of publicity given to the report.
The Act also contains a provision permitting the victims of eavesdropping performed in violation of the statute to recover civil damages of 100 dollars per day or 1,000 dollars, whichever is higher, in
addition to punitive damages, a reasonable attorney's fee, and court
costs.223 This provision could also have the beneficial result of
reducing illegal eavesdropping when such illicit surveillance does in
£act come to light. Damage actions against illegal police activity in
other contexts have not been overly effective in reducing police misconduct; however, some of the people whose conversations are
hands of the Buffalo, New York, police. Fiedler, an outspoken proponent of marijuana
legalization and an equally outspoken critic of the Buffalo Narcotics Squad, was arrested
in 1967 for maintaining premises where marijuana was located. The prosecution's case
is based entirely on evidence obtained by sending a sixteen-year-old girl, a school
friend of the Fiedler's fifteen-year-old daughter, into Fiedler's home some eighteen
to twenty-seven times over a nine-week period. On each entry the girl, who was in a
psychiatric hospital immediately before she was engaged by the police to spy on the
Fiedlers, carried a radio transmitter which broadcast conversations in the home to
police listening outside. There were times that the girl would insist on coming in
with gifts even when Mrs. Fiedler told her not to visit that day. There is no evidence
in the record that the police had probable cause to believe that Fiedler or anyone
else in the house was involved in lawbreaking when they first sent the girl in. At
the hearing the girl admitted lying under oath to Fiedler's counsel about whether she
had planted any drugs in the Fiedler home. Record of Hearing To Suppress Evidence at
67, People v. Kurt Fiedler, 4 CR. L. REP. 2187 (App. Div. N.Y. Nov. 31, 1968).
The case against Leslie Fiedler has not yet been tried. In a companion case involving
Fiedler's son, an appeal from a lower court's denial of a motion to suppress the evidence
obtained by the girl was rejected by a 3-2 vote although on grounds other than those cited
by the trial court. The latter relied on Justice White's reaffirmation of On Lee in
his concurrence in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. at 362, 363 n.•, but the Appellate
Division majority ruled instead that the search warrant which produced the evidence
had not been based on eavesdropping evidence. People v. Kurt Fiedler, 4 CR. L. REP. 2187
(App. Div. N.Y. Nov. 31, 1968).
223. Act § 2520.
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illegally overheard may be in a better financial position to bring
suit effectively than the class of people who are normally victims of
the more traditional modes of police misconduct.

IV. THE

NEED FOR ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE

Title Ill's grant of the power to issue these latter-day general
warrants is rationalized by the claim that without electronic surveillance the fight against organized crime would collapse,224 and that
with this failure the foundations of the Republic would totter. 2215
But the public seems to want many of the illicit services provided by
organized crime, and is still rather apathetic about combatting it226
despite steady torrents of propaganda during the last ten years. The
community is, however, seriously agitated about street crime and
riots. Thus, these concerns were frequently invoked during the floor
debate on title III, 227 even though electronic surveillance has nothing
to do with alleviating either problem. But by the manipulation of
such irrelevancies is major legislation enacted.228
One cannot confidently make the unqualified assertion that electronic eavesdropping is not a useful device. Its very "dirtiness"-its
secret intrusion into what people try to keep confidential-seems to
ensure that it would be of some value to law enforcement agencies,
just as the threat and application of coercion probably produce a
significant number of confessions. But the issue in both cases is the
indispensability of the technique to the solution of major crimes,
and with both electronic eavesdropping and confessions, the myth
of necessity may far surpass the reality. 229 Most of the ABA Com224. S. REP. No. 1097, at 74; ABA STANDARDS 70-78.
225. ABA STANDARDS 26-43; especially 40-43; S. REP. No. 1097, at 70-74.
226. Gardiner, Public Attitude Toward Gambling and Corruption, 374 ANNAIS
123 (1967); Ruth, Why Organized Crime Thrives, id. at 113, 120-22 (1967).
227. See, e.g., 114 CoNG. REc. S6207 (Senator McClellan on the dangers of the situation in Washington at night), S6197 (and on the need to eavesdrop on black militants) (daily ed. May 23, 1968).
228. In the House, proponents of the Crime Control Act overcame what was expected to be stiff opposition, primarily by invoking the assassination of Senator
Robert F. Kennedy [see, e.g., 114 CONG. REc. H4587 (daily ed. June 6, 1968) (remarks
of Melvin Laird); id. at H4595-96 ijune 6, 1968) (remarks of Roman C. Pucinski)] even
though Kennedy was on record as opposing both title II and title III. For his views on
title II, see 114 CONG. REc. S6019 (daily ed. May 21, 1968) (paired for amendment striking
title II); on title III, see id. at S6210 (May 23, 1968) (Senator Byrd stating that Senator
Kennedy was absent, but if present would vote for striking all of title III).
229. With respect to confessions, see S. REP. No. 1097, at 151 (minority report) and
numerous studies including Medalie, Zeitz, &: Alexander, Custodial Police Interrogation in Our Nation's Capital: The Attempt To Implement Miranda, 66 Mica. L.
REv. 1347 (1968); Seeburger &: Wettick, Miranda in Pittsburgh-A Statistical Study,
29 U. PITT. L. R.Ev. 1 (1967); Note, Interrogations in New Haven: The Impact of
Miranda, 76 YALE L.J. 1519 (1967). For a critical analysis of equally fervent claims
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mittee's general commentary is devoted to this question, and since
this commentary is the most thorough version of arguments that have
been presented elsewhere,230 it will be the focus of attention here.
A. The ABA Case for "Need"

After setting forth some twenty pages on the evils of organized
crime, the Advisory Committee concedes that statistics are "wanting"
to prove the need for electronic surveillance as a technique in attacking this problem. The Committee then asserts that "[d]ecision here
. . . must rest on the sort of 'pragmatic evidence' that is not 'wanting.' " 231 Then follow a summary statement of the information
obtained from a bug that was apparently in continuous operation for
over three years 232 and a description of the Berger investigation, in
which bugging of course played a large part. Recognizing that at
most these two cases prove utility and not indispensability, the Committee then discusses the shortcomings of what has heretofore been
one of the principal methods of investigating organized crime, the
use of informers. According to the Committee, informants can provide only fragmentary data and are often unreliable and afraid of
reprisals; moreover, grants of immunity from prosecution may
result merely in defiance or perjury. For reasons that are not made
clear, the Committee asserts that such informants can do nothing to
prevent crime but rather are useful only to solve crimes that have
already been committed.233
Supposedly because of these difficulties, according to the ABA,
no law enforcement office other than that of New York County District Attorney Frank Hogan has been very successful in fighting organized crime. Since former Attorney General Ramsey Clark has
of necessity with respect to investigative arrests, attacks on Mapp v. Ohio, and on
Mallory v. United States, see Kamisar, On the Tactics of Police-Prosecution Oriented
Critics of the Courts, 49 CORNELL L.Q. 436, 446-71 (1964).
230. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 1097 passim; Brief for National District Attorneys' Association, in Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967), reprinted in Hearings Before
Subcomm. No. 5 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 1055-142
(1967).
231. ABA STANDARDS 54. The approach is reminiscent of Professor Fred E. Inbau's
claim when attacking the McNabb-Mallory rule: "I cannot answer the ••• point with
any statistics of my own ••• but some simple logic is available to support the proposition that the McNabb-Mallory rule does, and is bound to have, a crippling effect
upon law enforcement •.••" More About Public Safety v. Individual Liberties, 53
J. CRIM. L.C.8:P.S. 329, 331 (1962). Professor Kamisar's article, supra note 229, shows
how unreliable "simple logic" can be, as do many of the studies of the impact of
Miranda v. Arizona; see, e.g., sources cited in note 229 supra.
232. ABA STANDARDS 54.
233. But cf. Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323 (1966).
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frequently denied the indispensability of electronic eavesdropping,23 4'
the Advisory Committee takes special pains to show that the Justice
Department's effort has "not been a success. The alternative to surveillance has, in short, been tried and found wanting." 285 This general
conclusion is buttressed by conclusions from the English Privy
Councillors' Report in 1957,236 the National Crime Commission
Report, 237 and other studies.
B. Analysis of the Case for Need

The section dealing with the indespensability of electronic surveillance is by far the weakest part of the ABA tentative draft. Vve
are not given the balanced analysis one might have expected from
such a blue ribbon group as the ABA Advisory Committee, particularly in view of the quality of other ABA reports in the criminal
justice area; rather, we are presented with a one-sided brief, full of
half-truths and bootstrapping. For example, the commentary relies
heavily on "the two most comprehensive studies undertaken of
electronic surveillance: the report of the English Privy Councillors
in 1957 and the recent report of the President's [Crime] Commission ...." 238 The first work is cited and quoted frequently in the
draft and elsewhere, 239 yet nowhere is it even mentioned that of the
three Privy Councillors who compiled the Report, one dissented
and called for restrictions so severe that "interception would practically cease to be used" for detection of crime.24° Citations to the
Crime Commission Report involve a substantial element of bootstrapping, for the ABA Advisory Committee Reporter was the
chief consultant on electronic surveillance for the Crime Commission. Thus, the Advisory Committee quotes a statement that "electronic surveillance techniques ·were termed 'the tools' " in fighting
234. See, e.g., 1967 Long Subcommittee Hearings 48.
235. ABA STANDARDS 77.
236. REPORT OF THE COMMITIEE To INQUIRE INTO THE INTERCEPTION OF COMMUNICA.•
TIONS, Cmnd. No. 283 (1957).
237. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAw ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF Jusna:,
THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY (1967).
238. ABA STANDARDS 78.
239. See, e.g., Berger Brief, supra note 230, at 40, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47.
240. REPORT, supra note 236, at 38, 1f 170 (dissent of P.C. Gordon Walker). Incl•
dentally, the results of the majority Privy Councillors' approach, and perhaps a
forecast of what may befall us, were reported recently under the headline: "Britons
live among army of snoopers." The article stated that a recent report by a Com•
mittee for the Public Protection of Privacy found that "Scotland Yard has 25 lines
which can be used for intercepting phone calls within a radius of 100 miles. The
general post office [which operates the phone system] has 40 wiretap officers on full•
time duty, and another 30 snoopers attached by other agencies •••• Britain's intelligence • • • operate 400-plus wiretaps throughout the country." The Detroit News,
Sept. 18, 1968, at 1-F, col. I.
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organized crime,241 but it fails to reveal that the statement was made
by the ABA Reporter himself in a research paper prepared for the
Crime Commission's Task Force on Organized Crime.242
The analysis of relative success in combatting organized crime of
those jurisdictions with and without eavesdropping authority is
especially one-sided. New York is said to be the only jurisdiction
which has been successful in fighting organized crime, allegedly
because of its use of electronic eavesdropping.243 At most, this would
prove only that New York has used this weapon effectively and not
that the state could not have done the job equally well without it.
It is obviously impossible to know whether New York could continue
its success in this area without electronic eavesdropping for it has
never had to try-its organized crime investigations have been built
around such techniques for almost thirty-five years.
Second, has New York really been so successful? Some of organized crime's most powerful years in New York were during the
1940's2H when the New York police tapped without any inhibitions,
and New York is still the center of organized crime.245 Since this objection has been made frequently, the ABA Committee and the Crime
Commission both respond with the comment that Mr. Hogan's office
has lacked resources and manpower to do more.246 Yet, the New York
County District Attorney's Office is one of the largest and best
equipped in the nation, with over a hundred lawyers, ten special investigators, approximately six accountants, and seventy-five elite
police officers permanently assigned to it.247 In addition, it is backed
by a 28,000-man police force which has laboratories and other modern
facilities; the New York State Intelligence and Information Service
with its electronic computers; and the cooperation, when necessary,
241. ABA STANDARDS 75-76.
242. TASK FORCE REPORT ON ORGANIZED CRIME 95. The technique is reminiscent of
that used by former Narcotics Commissioner Harry Anslinger to build up the marijuana phobia. See Skolnick, Coercion to Virtue: The Enforcement of Morals, 41
S. CAL, L. R.Ev. 588, 598-601 (1968).
243. ABA STANDARDS 75, citing THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY, supra
note 237, at 201.
244. The famous conversation between Frank Costello and Judge Thomas Aurelio,
ABA STANDARDS 41, occurred in the 1940's. THE KEFAUVER REPORT ON ORGANIZED
CRIME 102-05 (Didier ed. 1951). On organized crime in the 1940's see generally id.
245. Eighty percent of all Cosa Nostra members are said to live in the New JerseyNew York area or in Chicago. Hearings Before the House Subcomm. on Government
Operations on the Federal Effort Against Organized Crime, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., at 48
(1967) (testimony of Fred M. Vinson, Jr.).
246. ABA STANDARDS 76, citing THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY, supra
note 237, at 202, as authority.
247. Mayer, Hogan's Office Is a Kind of Ministry of Justice, N.Y. Times, July 23,
1967, § 6 (M'agazine) at 7, col. 1.
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of the district attorneys of the four other counties that comprise
New York City, to say nothing of the potential assistance of police
and prosecutors outside of the city. How large a law enforcement
establishment must a free society support in order to deal with this
problem if one of the largest and best prosecutorial offices in the
nation cannot do an adequate job even with electronic eavesdropping
powers?
Moreover, even the evidence cited by the ABA undermines the
claim that New York is the only jurisdiction in the country that has
achieved success in this area. Both the ABA commentary and the
Crime Commission Report praise Chicago, which operates under one
of the stiffest anti-eavesdropping laws in the nation, as having one of
the best programs aimed at organized crime.248 The Los Angeles
police department, which has been forced to operate without electronic eavesdropping authority in recent years, was also rated
highly. 249 Both departments have of course asked for eavesdropping
authority250-although leading law enforcement authorities in both
states have denied its indispensability-but such requests are hardly
surprising given today's atmosphere.
Indeed, the Crime Commission Report, carefully analyzed, does
not say that only New York has had success but rather that only New
York has had "continuous success." 251 It is unlikely that the uniqueness of this continuity resulted primarily from the use of electronic
eavesdropping. Rather, a good part of the answer is that other cities
have had a rapid turnover of district attorneys, many of whom have
had a distinct lack of interest in fighting organized crime. 252 In New
York, on the other hand, Frank Hogan and his predecessor, Thomas
Dewey, have been in office for almost thirty-four years, and both
have continuously given top priority to fighting organized crime.
Indeed, as Samuel Dash and his colleagues discovered, and as Professor Westin has recently confirmed,253 many other cities have actually used wiretapping for crime detection, albeit illegally, and yet
they did not achieve the "continuous success" that New York has
supposedly enjoyed.
248. ABA STANDARDS 25, citing TASK FORCE REPORT ON ORGANIZED CRIME at 12-14
nn.110, 111, 114.
249. TASK FORCE REPORT 12-14.
250. 1967 Long Committee Hearings 567-72 (testimony of Orlando Wilson); TASK
FORCE REPORT 13-14 n.114 (Chicago); id. at 12 n.110 (Los Angeles).
251. TASK FORCE REPORT 201 (emphasis added).
252. See Ruth, supra note 226, and TASK FORCE REPORT ON ORGANIZED CRIME 13.
253. See generally s. DASH, R. KNOWLTON&: R. SCHWARTZ, THE EAVESDROPPERS.
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Perhaps the weakest link in the ABA Committee's whole argument is the denigration of the federal effort. The Advisory Committee summarizes its dissatisfaction by complaining that the Department of Justice, with all its investigative resources-save eavesdropping since 1967-has been able to convict only 102 out of 5,000
Casa Nostra members. Informants are ineffective, tax cases are
becoming too difficult to make, immunity statutes are inadequate. In
short, without electronic surveillance little can be accomplished,
and former Attorney General Ramsey Clark, who ordered an end
to federal eavesdropping in June 1967,254 was apparently too uninformed or too indifferent about fighting organized crime.
The facts, however, simply do not support this argument. In the
first place, one obviously cannot blame any pre-1967 ineffectiveness
on the lack of eavesdropping authority (or on Ramsey Clark for
that matter), for federal authorities eavesdropped extensively until
then, as has been mentioned. Moreover, the situation today does
not support the charge of inevitable inadequacy. Apart from the fact
that the file cards of the Justice Department's Criminal Division
list only some two thousand Casa Nostra members, 255 a Justice
Department report in September 1968, the first since the Department began to implement Clark's "strike force" approach, shows
quite a significant increase in such prosecutions and convictions.256
The 1968 annual report of the FBI claims equal success, including,
just in this one year, an impressive number of convictions of persons
who seem to be quite important in organized crime; 257 since these
254. PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 126-30.
255. Hearings, supra note 245, at 24.
256. Press Release, Department of Justice, Sept. 4, 1968: "Of 210 known or suspected
members of La Cosa Nostra indicted or convicted during the past 13 years, 48 were
indicted or convicted during fiscal 1968.'" Congressional budget-cutting has recently
been said to threaten this effort; see Fight on Organized Crime Gains, but Tight
Budget Hurts, Ann Arbor News, Nov. 17, 1968, at 1, col. 4.
257. FBI ANNUAL REPORT, FISCAL YEAR 1968 3-4 (1968):
For the FBI [the 1968 fiscal year] was a year of striking accomplishment against
the bulwark of the hoodlum criminal conspiracy-La Cosa Nostra. Clearly
evidencing ever deeper penetration into the organized crime network in the past
few years, FBI probes netted the convictions of 281 hoodlum, gambling and vice
figures for violations within the Bureau's jurisdiction-a dramatic increase over
the previous record total of 197 convicted during the preceding fiscal year.
Although there is some skepticism about FBI figures in some quarters (See Kohlmeier, Hoover Loses Immunity to Criticism Despite "Law-and-Order" Mood, Wall
St. J., Oct. 10, 1968, at 1, col. 6 at 14, col. 1.), the Standards of course show little of this
skepticism.
The Bureau has even been able to move against Stefano Magaddino (see Spieler,
Magaddino: Mobster or a Loving Father?, Rochester Democrat & Chronicle, Nov. 30,
1968, at lA, col. 4), whom Professor Blakey recently singled out as someone whom
the federal government was not able to indict because of its lack of eavesdropping
powers. 1967 Long Committee Hearings 962.
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reports there have been additional successes.258 Indeed, this federal
effort has been so successful that President Nixon's "main congressional advisers on crime," the House Republican Task Force on
Crime, overcame its customary hostility to Ramsey Clark and recommended not only that his coordinated strike forces be "expanded,"
but that electronic surveillance "should be utilized on an extremely
selective and carefully controlled basis," with bugging used especially rarely. 259
The ABA Committee makes dire predictions that even the
"unsuccessful" federal performance will get worse, for many federal
prosecutions are in tax cases, and these are getting harder to make
as criminals increase the amount of earnings they report. 260 Here,
too, the facts seem otherwise: an IRS spokesman told Congress in
1967 that tax convictions were increasing,261 and the increase in
arrests and convictions recently reported bear him out.262
Perhaps the federal effort is not yet a "success." It may never
be-"success" is an ambiguous term. After all, how many more convictions of the high-level officials of organized crime could one ever
obtain, even with every investigative resource possible, given the
inevitable problems of detection and proof in such cases? But if the
comparison is made with prior years or other jurisdictions, it is
hard to call the federal drive against organized crime-which
started in 1959, moved into high gear only when Robert F. Kennedy
became Attorney General, and is just beginning to pay off-not a
"success."
The arguments against the indispensability of eavesdropping
authority are reinforced by the fact that many career law enforcement officers apparently do not consider this power essential. These
include former Attorney General Stanley Mask of California263
(now a justice of that state's supreme court), former Cook County,
Illinois, State's Attorney Dan Ward, 264 former Detroit Police Com258. E.g., Fox, U.S. Anticrime Force in Brooklyn Strikes Again, N.Y. Times, Dec.
20, 1968, at 31, col. 3.
259. Graham, Nixon Is Given Plan To Combat Crime, N.Y. Times, Dec. 18, 1968,
p. 1, col. 8. The intensity and success of the federal effort is also considered one of
the main reasons why American criminals are moving into English gambling. Wall
St. J., Nov. 8, 1968, at 1, col. l.
Attorney General John Mitchell has not, however, indicated any great reluctance to
use the powers given him by title III. See Graham, Mitchell To Use Wiretap Powers in
Fight on Crime, N.Y. Times, Jan. 15, 1969, at 1, col. 4.
260. ABA STANDARDS 77.
261. Hearings, supra note 245, at 108 (testimony of William Kolar).
262. See text accompanying notes 256-58 supra.
263. 1961 Senate Hearings 545.
264. Id. at 400.
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missioner Ray Girardin, 265 Senator Thomas Eagleton of Missouri,266 former Attorney General Thomas McBride of Pennsylvania, 267 former Philadelphia District Attorney Samuel Dash, and
many others. Judge Isadore Dollinger, former Bronx District Attorney, recently commented that even with respect to investigations of
gambling-the "lifeblood" of organized crime and the area where
most eavesdropping takes place-wiretapping is not of much use. 268
One federal prosecutor told a Wall Street Journal reporter: "All
this bugging flap and most of the time we got nothing." 269 Indeed,
even]. Edgar Hoover once called electronic eavesdropping "a handicap to the development of sound investigational technique," 270
although today this "handicap" has apparently been overcome, at
least in Mr. Hoover's eyes.
Even if electronic eavesdropping were as vital to the fight against
organized crime as its most ardent proponents claim, its legitimation
by the Crime Control Act would still not be "successful" in removing organized crime as a force in American life. At most, as is evident
from the experience in New York, a few more criminals may be
convicted in other cities and places. But even this result is unlikely,
for, as most specialists on organized crime will readily agree, there
are other basic and perhaps insuperable problems: public apathy;
police corruption,271 perhaps fostered by poor police salaries and
training; light sentences in gambling cases; a lack of coordinated
intelligence and other cooperation between enforcement agencies; 272
265. See letter of March 3, 1967, to the author, quoted in 1967 Long Committee
Hearings 405.
266. 1961 Senate Hearings 554-55.
267. Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Comm.
on the Judiciary, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. I, 25 (1958).
268. Zion, Dollinger Is Favored in Bronx, But Calandra Stays Optimistic, N.Y.
Times, Nov. 2, 1967, at 36, col. 2, 3.
269. Landauer, Agents' Eavesdropping Hurts U.S. Campaign Against Racketeering,
Wall St. J., March 6, 1967, p. I, col. I, p. II, col. 2. In Olmstead itself [Olmstead v.
United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1927)], the now disavowed grandfather of all the wiretapping and bugging cases, the jury foreman stated that "the telephone conversations
virtually were disregarded." Quoted in ·w. MURPHY, WIRETAPPING ON TRIAL: A CASE
STUDY IN THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 45 (1965).
270. Quoted in Note, Wiretapping and Law Enforcement, 31 HARV. L. REv. 863, 870
n.5!1 (1940).
271. See Council of Judges of the National Council on Crime and Delinquency,
Search Warrants and Organized Crime: A Policy Statement, (32 pages of unnumbered
text) (1966): "[T]he most obvious expense of organized crime is the purchase of protection and • • • the primary agency to be corrupted by such purchase is the local
police." See also Smith, The Mob: You Can't Expect Police on the Take To Take
Orders, LIFE MAGAZINE, Dec. 6, 1968, at 40.
272. See 1961 REPORT OF THE NEW YORK STATE INVESTIGATING COMMISSION ON SYNDI·
CATED G.umUNG 100-10; Gardner, supra note 226; Kamisar, Comment, ABA SECTION OF
INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AND REsl'ONSIBIUTIES MONOGRAPH No. 1, 37 (1967); Ruth, supra note
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and a fear of implicating highly placed political or business figures
and other community leaders who often work with and protect
major organized-crime leaders. The Crime Commission's Task Force
on Organized Crime found that very few police departments and
prosecutors' offices even had special units in this area. 273 Thus, few
prosecutors are really interested in attacking organized crime for
such investigations may touch very powerful officials on whom an
elected prosecutor must depend and with whom he must work.274
Surely the dangerous and quite uncontrolled eavesdropping power
of title III should not be entrusted to men who are likely to use it
not for the allegedly limited and grave purpose for which it was
created, but rather, for more trivial matters. In making this grant of
sweeping power, are we not authorizing use of a very dangerous
drug to treat the common cold? Indeed, this loose legislation, with
its extensive list of offenses that can be investigated by eavesdropping even though they have no substantial or even ostensible connection with organized crime, actually encourages such indiscriminate use.
What then can be done to combat organized crime? Even if
eavesdropping is merely useful and not indispensable to this effort,
should we not at least grant the authority to employ electronic surveillance to those who will actually use it against this troublesome
force in our community? How many weapons can we take away
from our law enforcement officers and still leave them with effective
tools? Perhaps the only real answer here, as in so many of society's
other crime problems, is that effective law enforcement is really not
the first line of defense against crime or even a very significant
aspect of crime control. In a free society, forcible repression rarely
brings about a lasting solution to a social problem, though it may
be othenvise in a totalitarian state. Other solutions must be sought
which strike at the social and economic structure out of which
226. Problems of cooperation often exist within the federal establishment, although the
Justice Department's strike force technique has apparently been quite successful. See notes
257-58 supra; Calame 8e Steiger, State, Federal Officials Team Up To Intensify Drive
Against Crime, Wall St. J. May 15, 1968, at I, col. 6; Kohlmeier, supra note 257
("The FBI has refused to assign its agents to strike forces. And in the Justice
Department there are strong feelings that Mr. Hoover's independence is rendering the
effort far less effective than it could be.").
273. TASK FORCE REPORT ON ORGANIZED CRIME 12.
274. See, e.g., the problems for the Hudson County prosecutor which arose when
a Congressman with ties to the local county leader was charged with being involved
with organized crime. Sullivan, Hudson Prosecutor Investigating Charges Against
Gallagher, N.Y. Times, Aug. 14, 1968, at 41, col. 3; Smith, supra note 271.
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specific types of crime arise. Thomas Schelling has observed, in a
Crime Commission research paper which that body seems to have
ignored, that criminals who provide illegal services depend upon
an absence of legitimate competition.275 Effective prohibition and
law enforcement against potential legitimate or illegitimate competitors reinforce the criminal's illicit monopoly and keep the
monopoly returns high. When he loses the monopoly, he quits.
Organized crime abandoned the liquor industry after Prohibition
was repealed because it was "rather swamped . . . with competition,"276 not because of the extensive law enforcement effort. Therefore, one solution may be selective "decriminalization" in areas such
as gambling, a proposal which was concurred in recently by an IRS
spokesman.277 As Professor Norval Morris has said with respect to
gambling: "It seems to me late in the day for us to be further delaying removal of the major financing of organized crime in this country. . .. There is no evidence whatsoever that gambling legislation
reduces the incidence of gambling and virtually nobody believes that
it does .... Have we got to continue this charade?"278 The practicality of this approach can be seen in Nevada, for example, where the
entry of Howard Hughes and other legitimate operators into the
gambling business seems to be driving the criminal element out.279
Loan sharking, another principal source of revenue for organized
crime might be reduced if we directly confronted the problem of providing legitimate sources of capital for hard-pressed debtors, although
this may be quite difficult where very poor risks are involved. Similarly, the ABA Advisory Committee deplores the drug addict's misery
and the terrible cost that his crime inflicts upon society. Yet, paradoxically but inevitably, stringent enforcement of the narcotics laws
worsens the addict's life and increases his criminal activity by driving the supply of drugs down and the price up. In all the service
areas where organized crime thrives, decriminalization or legitimate
275. Schelling, Economic Analysis and Organized Crime, TASK FORCE REPORT app.
D 114, 116-17.
276. Id. at 124.
277. Hearings, supra note 245, at 70 (testimony of William Kolar). See also Kadish,
The Crisis of Overcriminalization, 374 ANNALS 157 (1967).
278. Morris, Politics and Pragmatism in Crime Control, FED. PROBATION, June
1968, 9, 14.
279. Lehman, Crime, The Public, and the Crime Commission: A. Critical Review
of the Challenge of Crime in a Free Society, 66 MICH. L. REv. 1487, 1536-37 (1968).
Professor Lehman also points to the exodus of the criminal element from bars which
cater to homosexuals as reduced police harassment of such places encourages legitimate businesses to enter. Id. at 1536.
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competition might well do far more good280 than giving prosecutors dangerous weapons to fight a war that very few want to enter
and none can win.
An approach which tries to substitute decriminalization for repression requires rationality and patience. Moreover, the law enforcement job that inevitably remains calls for substantial training
and other expenditures and a willingness to cooperate by jealously independent entities like the FBI, the Treasury Department,
and local governmental agencies. 281 In contrast, electronic eavesdropping seems "so easy"; as Ramsey Clark has noted: "[I]t doesn't
cost anything in the sense that it would cost something to increase
police salaries .... It's something that can be done with the words
of the law ...." 282
V.

CONCLUSION

One of the vices of a one-sided presentation of important issues
is that responsive criticism inevitably appears equally one-sided.
Thus, a few caveats are in order when considering the ABA Standards and title III.
The foregoing discussion is not meant to argue that electronic
eavesdropping is of little or no use in fighting organized crime.
As the ABA Committee correctly says, it is probably true that no
convincing demonstration can be made either way. The purpose
here has been to show only that there is a very strong doubt about
the need for eavesdropping, that the argument in support of eavesdropping authority is quite vulnerable to critical analysis. On the
other hand, the evidence clearly indicates that the electronic surveillance permitted by title III and the Standards will result in an
inherently intensive, widespread, and unavoidable encroachment on
some of our most necessary rights. As proponents of this new authority admit-indeed, proclaim-eavesdropping's great value is to provide strategic intelligence; but searching for such intelligence cannot
be reconciled either with the fourth amendment (and perhaps the
first as well) or with title Ill's ostensible limitation to specific crimes.
The burden on those who would justify eavesdropping's far-reaching
280. Morris, supra note 278, at 14. See generally H. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE
(1967).
281. See note 272 supra.
282. Clark, Transcript of speaking Freely, WNBC Television, May 12, 1968, at
29-30.
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intrusion upon individual liberty is very great. On the record presented by the ABA Committee, this burden has simply not been met.
Title III is an invitation to widespread eavesdropping and the
ABA Tentative Draft is little better. This should not have been
unexpected this year, or perhaps any year. Indeed, in one sense, these
times are not so unique. We have always had crime scares of one
kind or another-either domestic crime or international espionage
or internal subversion-and our legislatures have always been especially susceptible to this kind of pressure. It is for this reason that
the call for legislative solutions to crime problems283 usually ensures
an antilibertarian result. It is difficult to find very much recent
criminal legislation which is not repressive and law-enforcementoriented, except perhaps for the Federal Bail Reform Act of 1966.284
Almost no legislation, state or federal, has restricted police officers.
As our domestic cauldron continues to seethe, as young people,
angry, frustrated, and disenchanted, account for an increasing share
of our population and inevitably raise crime rates, as riots and disorders continue in part because men like Senators McClellan, Eastland, Dirksen, and others block social reform-as all these forces
persist, legislative action is likely to become more and more reactionary and repressive. This Article was written in the midst of the 1968
election campaign, when the primary concern of much of the electorate seemed to focus on the slogan "law and order"; how the new
Administration reacts may well determine how much domestic tranquility we will have.
Our best hope for maintaining and furthering individual liberty
lies with the courts, and particularly with the Supreme Court, since
it has at least some insulation from popular hysteria, and a special
concern for liberty. It cannot do everything of course, as the Chief
Justice somewhat poignantly acknowledged recently,285 especially
in a time of crisis. Indeed, lately the Court has seemed to draw back
from a strong libertarian position.286 The defeat of President Johnson's nomination of Abe Fortas to be Chief Justice-motivated as
it was primarily by resentment toward the Court for its attempts at
283. See, e.g., Friendly, The Bill of Rights as a Code of Criminal Procedure, 53 CALIF.
L. REv. 929 (1965).
284. 18 U.S.C. § 3146-52 (Supp. III, 1967), 80 Stat. 21.
285. Terry v. Ohio, 389 U.S. I, 13-14 (1967).
286. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968); Walker v. Birmingham, 388
U.S. 307 (1967); Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966); Steel, Nine Men in Black Who
Think White, N.Y. Times, Oct, 13, 1967, § 6 (Magazine), at 56, col. 1.

510

Michigan Law Review

enhancing individual liberty-may make the Justices even more
gun-shy. But if we must rely on legislative solutions to these problems, we are indeed in a bad way; the Omnibus Crime Control and
Safe Streets Act of 1968 may well be symptomatic of what we can
expect.

